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Bankruptcy Law-The Continued Vitality of the Six-Months
Rule in Railroad Receiverships
One hundred years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court in Fosdick v. Schall' first set forth the six-months rule for estab-
lishing creditors' priorities in railroad receiverships. The rule, as pro-
nounced by the Fosdick Court and amplified in subsequent decisions,
gives priority in payment to unsecured creditors who, within a period
of six months prior to the initiation of reorganization proceedings, 2
supply materials or services necessary to the continued operation of the
railroad.3 In recent years the rule has been in issue in litigation arising
out of receiverships involving the Penn Central Transportation Com-
pany,4 the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company,5
and the Tennessee Central Railway Company.' In the ongoing Penn
Central reorganization, for example, claims under the six-months rule
total some $62.5 million.7
Despite its continuing importance, the six-months rule has been
inconsistently applied during its century of development.' The courts,
1. 99 U.S. 235 (1878).
2. The rule is applicable in appropriate railroad reorganization proceedings by virtue of sec-
tion 77(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970), which provides:
For all purposes of this section unsecured claims, which would have been entitled to
priority if a receiver in equity of the property of the debtor had been appointed by a
Federal court on the day of the approval of the petition, shall be entitled to such priority
and the holders of such claims shall be treated as a separate class or classes of creditors.
3. Although the Supreme Court has never applied the rule outside the railroad receivership
context, the lower federal courts have employed the rule in cases involving public or quasi-public
corporations. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTCY 9.13[5], at 1633 (14th ed. J. Moore 1978); see, e.g.,
In re Madison Ry., 115 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1940); Crane Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 238 F. 693 (9th
Cir. 1916), cer. denied, 244 U.S. 658 (1917); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Memphis Gaslight Co., 125 F.
97 (6th Cir. 1903).
4. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 21, 1970).
5. See In re New York, N.H. & H.RR., 278 F. Supp. 592 (D. Conn. 1967), afd, 405 F.2d
50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
6. See In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
7. Affidavit of Aidan Mullett at 11, In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed
June 20, 1970).
8. See In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 138 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd per curiam,
230 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1956), where the court stated: "The researches of counsel supplemented by
such research as has been at my command have not resulted in the discovery of any principle
which would account for all of the decisions or even enough of the decisions so that one might say
there was a principle behind them." Id. at 625.
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particularly in recent years, have frequently applied the rule mechani-
cally, without sufficiently analyzing the particular questions before
them in relation to the underlying rationale of the rule. This has cre-
ated confusion concerning the application of the rule and resulted in a
number of issues that are in need of resolution.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
The six-months rule is an equitable doctrine that first appeared in
a federal equity receivership,9 Fosdick v. Schall. In that case the
Supreme Court recognized that the business of all railroad companies
is done, to a greater or lesser extent, on credit.' 0 When railroad com-
panies encounter financial difficulties, current debts for labor, supplies
and equipment are often allowed to accumulate so that mortgage pay-
ments may be made and a foreclosure postponed, if not avoided.1
The Court found this process to be inequitable because: "Every rail-
road mortgagee in accepting his security impliedly agrees that the cur-
rent debts made in the ordinary course of business shall be paid from
the current receipts before he has any claim upon the income."' 2 The
Supreme Court went on to hold that claims of prereceivership opera-
tions creditors' 3 were entitled to priority with respect to receivership
income, even though that income was subject to the lien of the rail-
road's underlying mortgage if, during or immediately prior to the re-
ceivership, income had been diverted to the benefit of the mortgagees. 14
Equity required that the mortgagees restore any such "diversions" to
the "current debt fund."' 5  The Court reasoned that every railroad
mortgagee impliedly agrees that current debts shall be paid first from
current receipts, because without operating creditors no income at all
9. The federal equity receivership was the precursor of the reorganization procedures now
applied under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). Generally, a creditor of
a financially distressed railroad would file a creditor's bill in federal court asking that a receiver-
ship of the property of the debtor be instituted. Once the receivership was commenced, the
debtor was protected from the attacks of subsequent creditors, and its business was continued
under the control of the receiver in order that all debts might be paid in an orderly fashion. The
formal function of the receivership was ended when the property of the debtor was sold by the
court to pay, to the extent possible, the claims of the creditors. See generally COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 3, 0.04.
10. 99 U.S. at 252.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. An "operations creditor" may be defined as an unsecured creditor who supplied labor or
materials necessary to the continued operation of the railroad. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
.rura note 3, 9.13[5], at 1635 & n.38.




would be produced and the value of the mortgage would be considera-
bly undermined.'6
In Burnham -. Bowen,17 the Supreme Court expanded upon the
Fosdick doctrine, declaring that current income itself, whether col-
lected prior to or during the receivership and regardless of diversions,
was encumbered by current debts arising out of the operations of the
railroad that produced the income." Thus, the Court held that current
debts should be paid first, out of either prereceivership or receivership
income.' 9 The Burnham Court also held that if diversions to the bene-
fit of the mortgagees from current income occurred, the current creditor
could have resort to the corpus of the mortgaged property to the extent
of the diversions.20 Further, the current creditor could insist on a sale
of the property to the extent of the diversions if he had not been paid.2'
Despite the Burnham Court's expansion of the Fosdick rule, the
Supreme Court did not intend to give current creditors an unqualified
priority over mortgagees. In Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust
Co. ,22 the Court restricted the application of the six-months rule by
emphasizing that the priority of mortgage liens over the corpus should
ordinarily be displaced only when diversions had occurred. 23 The
Court reprimanded those lower courts that had liberally allowed inva-
sions of the corpus of mortgaged property in order to satisfy the claims
of current creditors, stating: "[Tihe appointment of a receiver vests in
the court no absolute control over the property, and no general author-
ity to displace vested liens. . . .It is the exception and not the rule that
such priority of liens can be displaced."'24
16. See Burnham v. Bowen, Ill U.S. 776, 780 (1884).
17. 111 U.S. 776 (1884).
18. Id. at 780-81.
19. Id. at 782. See also Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170 U.S.
355, 365, 369 (1898). Receivership income is, however, first devoted to the expenses of the receiv-
ership. COLLIFR ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3, 0.04, at 40.
20. 111 U.S. at 782.
21. Id. at 782-83. In a later case, St. Louis, A. & T.H.R.R. v. Cleveland, C., C. & I. Ry., 125
U.S. 658 (1888), the Court explained that the current creditor must show as a condition precedent
to its right to resort to the corpus that the diversion occurred after the railroad became indebted to
it. Id. at 672.
22. 136 U.S. 89 (1890).
23. The priority of the mortgage lien may also be displaced through rare application of the
necessity of payment rule. See note 30 infra. See also Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197
U.S. 183 (1905); Miltenbrrger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286 (1882); Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F.
177 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 706 (1915); Carbon Fuel Co. v. Chicago, C. & L.R.R.,
202 F. 172 (7th Cir. 1912).
24. 136 U.S. at 97-98.
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In Southern Railway v. Carnegie Steel Co. ,25 the Supreme Court,
after reviewing its earlier cases dealing with the current creditors' prior-
ity,26 defined the class of creditors entitled to assert the priority as in-
cluding only those creditors who supplied materials and services
necessary to the operation of the railroad in reliance upon the current
income of the railroad, as opposed to its general credit, for payment.27
Thus, in Southern Railway the Court granted priority to a supplier of
steel rails, while in Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.,28 decided the same day as Southern Railway, the Court de-
nied priority to another supplier of steel rails because the latter supplier
had relied on the general credit rather than the current income of the
railroad.29
The Supreme Court's development of the six-months rule
culminated in Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co.3" In Gregg, a creditor
who had supplied a small quantity of railroad ties shortly before receiv-
ership proceedings began sought to have his debt satisfied from the
corpus of the estate. Although the Court recognized that the claimant
had a valid equitable lien on current income in the hands of the re-
ceiver, it found that no such fund of surplus earnings existed." More-
over, the Court found that no diversions had occurred by which the
mortgagees had profited.32  This finding affirmed the court of appeals'
holding33 that no diversion had occurred when payments on capital
improvements and other expense items that benefited the mortgagees
were more than matched by funds obtained by the railroad through
borrowings and receipts not considered to be part of current railroad
25. 176 U.S. 257 (1900).
26. Id. at 273-86.
27. Id. at 286.
28. 176 U.S. 298 (1900).
29. Id. at 316-17. See also Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170
U.S. 355, 365 (1898).
30. 197 U.S. 183 (1905). The Gregg decision restricts the necessity of payment rule estab-
lished in Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U.S. 286 (1882). The necessity of payment rule
allows the receiver to make distributions to current creditors out of the corpus regardless of
whether there have been any diversions to the benefit of the mortgagees. Id. at 312-13. Gregg
limited this power to the extraordinary circumstance in which payment of the claim is indispens-
able to the business of the railroad, as when the claimant supplies essential and otherwise unob-
tainable materials and threatens to cut off the railroad's supply if not paid. 197 U.S. at 187. See,
e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. Chicago, C. & L.R.R., 202 F. 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1912).
31. 197 U.S. at 188; see Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 124 F. 721, 721 (6th Cir. 1903),
aftd, 197 U.S. 183 (1905).
32. 197 U.S. at 186.
33. 124 F. 721 (6th Cir. 1903), at'd, 197 U.S. 183 (1905).
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income.34 Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied any priority to the
six-months claimant.3 5
These early Supreme Court decisions clearly set out the broad
framework of the six-months rule. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in a frequently cited passage from its opinion in Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. Albia Coal Co.,36 reduced that framework to three
requirements:
(1) That the consideration for the claim was a current expense of
ordinary operation of the railroad, necessarily incurred to keep it a
going concern.
(2) That the claim represents a debt contracted with the expectation
or intention of the parties that it was to be paid out of the current
earnings of the railroad.
(3) That the claim shall have accrued within six months prior to the
appointment of the receiver.37
Within this broad framework, however, courts have varied consid-
erably in their applications of the rule. In Southern Railway the
Supreme Court recognized that its own cases failed to lay down any
clearly definable or uniformly applied rule.38 It is not surprising, then,
that subsequent lower court decisions have left a number of issues un-
resolved.
THE EQUITABLE BASIS OF THE RULE
Several of the early Supreme Court decisions suggest that the basis
in equity of the six-months priority is that the current creditors have
protected the value of the mortgagees' security by keeping the railroad
running.39  Accordingly, the trustees of the Penn Central Transporta-
tion Company argue in that railroad's current reorganization proceed-
ing that
34. Id. at 727.
35. See 197 U.S. at 189.
36. 36 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1929).
37. Id. at 35. The requirement that the claim have accrued within six months was not
always strictly applied in the early cases. See St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Spiller, 274 U.S. 304, 311
(1927). The origin of the six month period as a limitation is unclear. See, e.g., Westinghouse Air
Brake Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 137 F. 26 (8th Cir. 1905) (six month period needed to avoid
secret liens); FitzGibbon, The Present Status of the Six Months' Rule, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 230,
240-41 (1934) (six months period borrowed from Illinois statute).
38. 176 U.S. at 285.
39. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland Ry., 117 U.S. 434,455 (1886); Burnham v.
Bowen, 111 U.S. 776, 780 (1884); Union Trust Co. v. Souther, 107 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1882). See
also In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 405 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999
(1969).
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the six months' priority is premised upon the granting of some spe-
cial benefit or enrichment by operations creditors in the six-month
period prior to bankruptcy, and on the receiving of that benefit or
enrichment by other creditors who therefore can be expected to bear
the burden of compensatory special treatment for the operations
creditors. 40
If, however, the continued operation of the railroad has served only to
decrease the value of the mortgagees' security through extensive oper-
ating losses, the trustees conclude that there is no equitable reason to
give priority to the six-months creditors over the mortgage liens.4 '
The trustees' analysis, however, fails to account for the cases that
have refused to apply the six-months rule in reorganizations of private
corporations other than railroads.42 As these cases illustrate, the basis
of the rule is the significant public interest in the continued operation of
the railroads.43 In ordinary receiverships, the only interests at stake
are those of the mortgagees and the various claimants; in railroad re-
ceiverships, the public's interest in continued railroad operation is par-
amount. Given the often tenuous financial condition of railroads,
frequently complicated by a heavy mortgage burden,' it would in
many cases be difficult for railroads to obtain the materials and labor
necessary for operation if railroads offered only their general credit as
security for operating creditors. Public policy therefore demands that
these claimants be given assurances of payment in the event of a bank-
ruptcy.
The Supreme Court's "implied agreement ' 4 in Fosdick v. Schall
is best seen as an unconvincing rationalization by the Court for its, at
that time, novel derogation of the mortgage liens.46  The equities of
current creditors' claims are the same whether the corporation in re-
ceivership is of public or merely private concern; it is the public interest
in the continued operation of the nation's railroads that justifies the six-
months rule's unique reordering of receivership priorities. 47 Thus, the
40. Memorandum in Support of Trustees' Position with Respect to Six Months' Claims at 1,
In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1970).
41. Id. at 2.
42. See In re Pusey & Jones Corp., 295 F.2d 479, 480 (3d Cir. 1961). But see Dudley v.
Mealey, 147 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 208 F. 168, 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1913), aff'd, 216 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632 (1915). But see Gregg v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co., 109 F. 220, 227-28 (6th Cir. 1901).
44. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1970).
45. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
46. See Wham, Preference in Railroad Receivershios, 23 ILL. L. REV. 141, 142-43 (1928).
47. Even when courts have considered the issue of benefit, they have often assumed that the
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only equitable condition precedent for the application of the rule is that
the materials or services provided by the claimant be necessary to the
continued operation of the railroad.
CURRENT OPERATING EXPENSES
In order to qualify for the six-months priority, a claim must be
based on a current expense arising from the ordinary operation of the
railroad.48  Materials and supplies directly associated with the opera-
tion of a railroad, such as rails or ties for normal track maintenance,
fuel, power and normal replacements for worn-out equipment, along
with the services associated with the provision of such materials, clearly
qualify as current expenses.49
Purchases of new equipment and new construction, as distin-
guished from repairs, however, do not fall within the preferred class of
claims, no matter how imperative the need therefor.50  The cases sug-
gest that the distinction lies in whether additions to equipment are be-
ing made, and whether the repairs merely restore the damaged
property or serve to improve its quality.5'
If the justification for the six-months priority rests upon the public
interest in the continued operation of the railroad, however, the test
ought to be whether the expense was necessary and proximately related
to the physical operation of the road. Thus, a supplier of new cars
needed to replace aged, deteriorated cars should be entitled to the pro-
tection of the six-months priority. A railroad should not be forced by its
search for credit to undertake stopgap repairs in lieu of buying new
continued operation of the railroad has benefited the value of the mortgagees' security. See, e.g.,
In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 316 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (M.D. Tenn. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972). This assumption rests on the theory that
a forced sale of a nonoperating railroad would obtain a reduced price as compared to a similar
sale of an operating property. For example, the good will attendant to an operating railroad
would presumably not be a factor in the sale of a railroad that had earlier ceased operations.
Although this assumption has been criticized as unrealistic given the possibility of an early reor-
ganization before the railroad's financial difficulties become so acute as to force the cessation of
operations, see In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. 592, 598 n.10 (D. Conn. 1967),
aI'd, 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969), no court has yet rejected a six-
months claim on the ground that the claimant produced no benefit to the mortgage creditors.
48. See FitzGibbon, supra note 37, at 235-38.
49. Id. Priority has been denied, however, to many items normally included in any ac-
counting methodology as operating expenses. This category includes tort claims, see, e.g., St.
Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, 70 F. 32 (8th Cir. 1895), debts for special legal services, the printing of
time tables, and premium payments for general liability insurance. See FitzGibbon, supra note
37, at 236-37.
50. See Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 176 U.S. at 315.
51. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 238 F. 693, 698 (9th Cir. 1916), cert. denied,
244 U.S. 658 (1917).
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equipment. The six-months rule should, in any event, be strictly ap-
plied to avoid unnecessary invasions of the vested contract rights of
railroad mortgagees.52 The courts ought to examine carefully whether
the asserted expense was indeed necessary; the rule should not serve to
subsidize the unwise expansion of a financially unstable railroad.
RELIANCE ON CURRENT OPERATING INCOME
As a further prerequisite for the six-months priority, a claimant
must demonstrate reliance on the current operating income of the rail-
road for payment, as opposed to reliance on the general credit of the
corporation.53 The six-months rule is designed to allow the railroad to
acquire materials and supplies that creditors would otherwise be reluc-
tant to sell because of a lack of security. Thus, when a claimant relies
on some form of security other than the generalized hope that railroad
operations will generate sufficient income to pay current debts, it
should not be entitled to the six-months priority. The claimant's reli-
ance upon the railway's general credit is determined by reference to the
amount of the debt, the time and terms of payment, and all other cir-
cumstances attending the transaction.54 It is not necessary to provide
direct evidence 9f the parties' expectation that the suppliers would be
paid out of current earnings."
Reliance on current income is perhaps best defined by way of con-
trast, in terms of those factors that indicate a reliance upon the general
credit of the railroad. When a claimant receives security, it is pre-
sumed that it relied upon the security and not upon current earnings. 56
Further, when payment is unreasonably deferred, it is presumed that
reliance was based upon the long-term financial condition of the com-
pany.57  Also, an unusually large expenditure, out of the ordinary
course of business of the railroad, may indicate that the general credit
of the railroad, rather than its current income, was relied upon.58
52. See Johnson Fare Box Co. v. Doyle, 250 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 938 (1958); Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co., 136 U.S. at 97-98.
53. See, e.g., Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 176 U.S. at 316-
17.
54. Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. at 285.
55. Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 216 F. 458, 471 (2d Cir. 1914), cert.
denied, 238 U.S. 632 (1915).
56. See Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 112 (1893).
57. E.g., Bound v. South Carolina Ry., 58 F. 473, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1893) (payment deferred
for eight months).
58. E.g., Rodger Ballast Car Co. v. Omaha, K.C. & E.R.R., 154 F. 629, 633 (8th Cir. 1907).
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It is not fatal to a current creditor's six-months claim, however, to
have taken the notes of the railroad debtor. In Southern Railway the
Supreme Court, emphasizing the small quantity of materials supplied
in that case and the short credit terms of the transaction, granted prior-
ity to a six-months claimant even though the claimant took the debtor's
promissory note. As the Court recognized, the use of the notes merely
showed that the creditor preferred to have its debt evidenced by negoti-
able commercial paper rather than to stand on open account.59
THE CURRENT DEBT FUND
The six-months priority attaches first to the current debt fund, also
known as the current expense fund.60 Surprisingly, in the one hundred
years during which case law concerning the six-months rule has devel-
oped, only one court has sought to define the current debt fund.61 In
In re New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,62 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated:
We hold that the availability of a current expense fund under the six-
months rule is to be determined by generally accepted accounting
practices, including those prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and that under those practices the current expense fund
is to be computed by deducting operating expenses and depreciation
from operating revenues.63
The Interstate Commerce Commission Annual Reports and generally
accepted accounting practices, upon which the New Haven court relied
in defining the current debt fund,64 are based on accrual accounting
59. 176 U.S. at 290.
60. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Albia Coal Co., 36 F.2d at 35. In theory, the priority could
attach first to the unmortgaged property of the railroad. See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York
City Ry., 208 F.168 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aft'd, 216 F. 458 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 632
(1915). It is unlikely, however, that the modem railroad forced into reorganization will have any
unmortgaged assets. It certainly will not have unmortgaged assets sufficient to satisfy all its six-
months creditors. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1970).
61. Many of the cases speak of the income available to satisfy the six-months claims and the
corpus, to the extent that it may be invaded by the six-months creditors, as together constituting
the current debt fund. See, e.g., In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 405 F.2d 50,52 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). In this Note, however, the two sources of funds will be dis-
cussed separately. In this section, the focus will be on determining the existence of an income
fund.
62. 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
63. Id. at 52.
64. The Supreme Court has used a variety of terms in referring to the current debt fund: net
earnings, Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. at 285; income, Virginia & Ala. Coal Co. v.
Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170 U.S. 355, 368 (1898); surplus earnings, Kneeland v. American
Loan & Trust Co., 136 U.S. at 96; current income, St. Louis, A. & T.R.R. v. Cleveland, C., C. & I.
Ry., 125 U.S. 658, 673 (1888); current earnings, Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U.S. at 780; and current
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principles. Accrual accounting reflects receivables and expenses as
they are earned or owed, rather than as they are paid.65 Thus, the
accrual accounting system reflects the actual financial position of the
railroad over an extended period of time.
The six-months claimant is, by definition, a short-term creditor; he
does not look to the complete, actual financial position of the debtor
railroad but to something more akin to its short-term cash flow posi-
tion. The accrual accounting method, therefore, unduly penalizes six-
months creditors. If the existence of a current debt fund is determined
by accrual accounting methods, the fund to which the priority of six-
months claimants may attach will be reduced by the amount of their
claims even though those debts have not yet been paid. This occurs
because, in order to reach net income, expenses are deducted from rev-
enues as those expenses are incurred, not as they are paid.
In rejecting the argument that accrual accounting principles
should not apply in determining the availability of a current debt fund,
the court in New Haven stated that the six-months creditors, at the time
they supplied the materials or services to the debtor railroad, had no
right to expect that accrued expenses would not be paid.6 6  The six-
months creditors, however, might well expect that their claims would
be given priority over all other unpaid debts and "paper" expenses in
the current income of the railroad.67 Certainly, the inclusion of paper
transactions such as depreciation in the calculation of expenses exacer-
bates the failure to reflect properly the nature of the six-months rule.
Since the six-months creditor must rely upon the railroad's short-term
ability to pay its current debts, the reduction of the current expense
fund by a noncash item such as depreciation, which does not directly
impair the railroad's short-term cash or current receipts position, is im-
proper.
receipts, Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. at 252. These terms do not, however, adequately define the
accounting basis for determining whether a current debt fund exists.
In In re New Hope & Ivyland R.R., 353 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the court defined
current income as the "excess of current receipts over current expenses." This does not, however,
establish whether an accrual or a cash method of accounting should be used or what expenses
should be considered current expenses. It was not necessary for the court in New Hope to reach
these issues because it denied the six-months priority on the ground that the railroad was acquir-
ing a capital asset.
65. H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 89 (1968).
66. 405 F.2d at 52.
67. Cf. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95 (1893) (six-months claimants must rely
"upon the interposition of a court of equity").
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It would be erroneous, however, to say that the current debt fund
should be defined simply as the cash and current receipts of the rail-
road. That definition does not recognize that the six-months priority
can only attach to cash and current receipts on hand-the six-months
rule makes no provision for the return of monies already paid out to
other current creditors. To define the current debt fund, therefore, as
the total of the railroad's cash and current receipts during the applica-
ble period is to overvalue the fund. The current debt fund is better
defined as the cash and current receipts on hand to pay current debts.
This definition is supported by a statement of the Supreme Court in
Gregg: "It is agreed that the petitioner may have a claim against sur-
plus earnings, if any, in the hands of the receiver .... -68 The Gregg
Court thus seemed to imply that the current debt fund to which the six-
months claimant has priority consists of the earnings on hand, rather
than the net financial position of the railroad.
69
INVASIONS OF CORPUS
Assuming that the current debt fund, however defined, is insuffi-
cient to satisfy all the six-months claims, the six-months creditors may,
in certain circumstances, look to the corpus of the mortgaged property.
The general rule as to invasions of the corpus in order to pay properly
qualified six-months claims was firmly established by the Supreme
Court in Gregg, in which the Court held that the corpus of the mort-
gaged property could ordinarily be charged with the six-months claims
only if, and to the extent that, there had been diversions from income to
the benefit of the mortgagees.7°
The Supreme Court had earlier defined "diversion" as the pay-
ment of mortgage interest, the purchase of new equipment, or the ac-
quisition of valuable additions out of the earnings which ought, in
68. 197 U.S. at 188.
69. In terms of generally accepted accounting principles, perhaps the closest analog to the
suggested definition would be the statement of changes in financial position, which reflects work-
ing capital flow. See J. SMITH & K. SKOUSEN, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 680, 684 (1977).
This statement is of primary importance to the short-term creditor as it reveals the financial re-
sources that will be available within a short period of time for debt payment. R. ScrHArxK, H.
JENsEN & V. BAN, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (1974). Funds from borrowings should be ex-
cluded from any definition of current debt fund in that they do not represent earnings or income
from the operations of the railroad.
70. 197 U.S. at 186-87. The corpus may also be invaded in order to pay current creditors
under the necessity of payment rule. See note 30 supra. It is clear that the necessity of payment
rule can have no relevance after the railroad has ceased operations, as is the case in the current
Penn Central proceedings. See Moore v. Donahoo, 217 F. 177, 182 (9th Cir. 1914), cert. denied,
235 U.S. 706 (1915) (necessity of payment rule premised on creditor's ability to halt operations).
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
equity, to have been dedicated to current debts.7' Thus, payments for
the benefit of mortgagees out of income that should have been devoted
to reduction of current debt give rise to a right in current creditors to
invade the corpus to the extent of the diversion. Taxes paid, however,
even though they redound to the benefit of the mortgagees, do not con-
stitute a diversion.72 In addition, diversions that occurred prior to the
creation of the six-months creditor's debt claim confer no right to in-
vade the corpus because the creditor at that time had no special equity
in current earnings.73
The Supreme Court's decision in Gregg established that when
payments for the benefit of mortgagees are offset by "free funds"-
capital funds derived from sources not connected with the operation of
the railroad, such as investments or borrowings-no diversion has oc-
curred.74 Although this proposition has not been discussed in any re-
cent case, it is based on sound logic as long as the free funds are
regarded as reimbursement pro tanto to the fund subject to the six-
months claims.
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Gregg that there can be
no invasion of the corpus in order to satisfy six-months claims unless
there previously has been a diversion from current earnings to the ben-
efit of mortgagees, a line of cases in the Fourth Circuit has developed a
current creditor's right to invade the corpus regardless of diversions.75
In Southern Railway v. Flournoy,76 the court held that income diversion
to mortgagees is not a prerequisite to corpus invasion "where there are
found-as special circumstances-all elements constituting the pre-em-
inent equity. ' 77  The Flournoy court, however, apparently confused
the six-months rule with the necessity of payment rule.78 The necessity
of payment rule, as set forth in Gregg, allows invasions of corpus with-
out any prior diversions only in the extraordinary situation in which
actual payment of the claim is essential to the continued operation of
71. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. at 253.
72. Texas Co. v. International & G.N. Ry., 237 F. 921 (5th Cir. 1916).
73. Fordyce v. Omaha, K.C. & E.R.R., 145 F. 544 (W.D. Mo. 1906).
74. See Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U.S. 183 (1905), af'g 124 F. 721 (6th Cir.
1903).
75. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1962); Virginia Passenger &
Power Co. v. Lane Bros., 174 F. 513 (4th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 610 (1910); Finance Co.
v. Charleston, C. & C.R.R., 62 F. 205 (4th Cir. 1894).
76. 301 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1962).
77. Id. at 851.
78. See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 278 F. Supp. at 602-03 n.15.
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the road.79 The special circumstances alluded to in the Flournoy deci-
sion" did not meet this standard. Thus the case, and the attendant
Fourth Circuit line of decisions, must be regarded as wrongly decided.
It is unclear how depreciation should be regarded for purposes of
the six-months rule. A diversion, as noted above, may be defined as
any payment that enhances the interests of the mortgagees. Con-
versely, depreciation represents the decreasing value of the mortgage
corpus over time. The question arises, then, whether depreciation
should properly be regarded as an offset to diversionary amounts spent
on additions and improvements by the debtor railroad. In the New
Haven case, the district court held that operating creditors have no eq-
uitable claim on revenues to the extent of depreciation, asserting that
such creditors have no equitable right to be protected from the eco-
nomic fact of depreciation. 8' In an earlier case, Flint v. Danbury &
Bethel Street Railway,8" however, the Connecticut Supreme Court re-
jected an attempt by mortgagees to offset diversions for interest pay-
ments with depreciation expenses. In effect, the court held this would
dedicate current earnings to the mortgagees to the extent of deprecia-
tion, contrary to the equitable principles of the rule.83
In this context it is important to note that it is the addition or bet-
terment that constitutes the enhancement of mortgaged property and,
hence, the diversion. Depreciation would have occurred irrespective
of whether any improvements were made to the mortgaged property.
The two items, improvements and depreciation, are therefore not re-
lated and should not be combined as offsets. As discussed above, 84
depreciation is a paper transaction that does not affect the debtor rail-
road's short-term ability to pay current debts and thus should not serve
to reduce the fund available for the payment of six-months claims.
79. See note 30 supra.
80. The "pre-eminent equity" asserted by the Flournoy court consisted of a combination of
the six-months and necessity of payment rules. See 301 F.2d at 850-5 1. The claims for traffic
balances that were granted priority in Flournoy, id. at 853-56, however, did not meet the stringent
requirements of the necessity of payment rule.
81. 278 F. Supp. 592, 604 (D. Conn. 1967), aj'd, 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 999 (1969).
82. 101 Conn. 13, 125 A. 194 (1924).
83. Id. at 20-21, 125 A. at 197.
84. See text accompanying notes 67 & 68 supra.
19781
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The utility of the six-months rule has suffered from a failure by
many courts to properly analyze the basis of the rule. The rule is
designed to protect the public's interest in the continued operation of
the nation's railroads by assuring payment of operations creditors de-
spite the precarious credit position of many railroads. The courts
should not render illusory the protection offered by the rule by the ap-
plication of inappropriate accounting standards; nor should the rule's
purpose be compromised by the improper exclusion of the cost of nec-
essary new purchases, or the inappropriate inclusion of charges for
such items as depreciation. The six-months rule has not lost its rele-
vance in the one hundred years since its inception-it has merely been
misapplied.
ALAN E. KR AUS
Copyright Law--One Step Beyond Fair Use: A Direct Public
Interest Qualification Premised On The First Amendment
In keeping with the copyright clause of the United States Consti-
tution,' the purpose of the copyright statute2 is to enhance the public
welfare by promoting the growth of learning and culture.3 To accom-
plish this purpose, Congress has accorded the copyright holder certain
This Note has been entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
2. Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-
810 (West 1977)). The Copyrights Act of 1976 revised Title 17 of the United States Code (gov-
erning copyrights) in its entirety. The new provisions became effective January 1, 1978, except §§
118, 304(b) and 801, which became effective October 19, 1976. The substantive issues discussed in
this Note concerning provisions of the former copyright statute are equally relevant to the new
provisions.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909) (copyright act intended "not pri-
marily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public"). See also Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION-REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm.




quasi-exclusive rights in his copyrighted work,4 providing thereby an
economic incentive for both the creation and the distribution of intel-
lectual and cultural works.' These rights are not absolute;6 traditional
copyright qualifications such as the doctrine of fair use7 prevent the
copyright owner from exercising total control over his work. There re-
main a few situations, however, in which the traditional qualifications
do not prevent the economic interests of the copyright owner from
overshadowing the public's interest in the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information and commentary. When the material is of such a
nature that it cannot be reduced to an assortment of facts or ideas,9 it is
clear that the copyright owner may prohibit any use of his copyrighted
work that might reasonably be expected to diminish its potential mar-
ketability- even though the proposed use may be of benefit to the pub-
lic welfare.1" For this reason, both courts and commentators have
begun to suggest that the copyright monopoly be further narrowed by
adoption of a direct public interest factor,' I founded either on the con-
stitutional purpose of the copyright statute1 2 or on the first amendment
4. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-118 (West 1977).
5. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
6. The monopoly given the copyright owner is limited in duration. 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West
1977) (life of the author plus 50 years). The copyright statute is not intended to prohibit copying
that is neither substantial nor material. A. LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY
No. 14 (1958), prepared for and reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss. (Comm. Print 1960) reprinted
in 2 STUD. COPYRIGHT 781, 784 (1963). The copyright does not extend to facts or ideas contained
in the copyrighted work. Id; Sobel, Copyright and the FirstAmendment:A Gathering Storm?, 19
ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 50 (1971).
7. The fair use doctrine allows for the reasonable and fair use of copyrighted material. See
2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1976 & Supp. 1976); Cohen, supra note 3. "Fair
use may be defined as a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright, to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner by the copyright." A. LATMAN, supra note 6, at 783 (quoting BALL, THE LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). The fair use doctrine was codified by the new
Copyrights Act at 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977). Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90
Stat. 2541 (1976).
8. See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
9. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Marvin Worth
Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hill v. Whalen & Mar-
tell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
11. See general l Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675,
678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 9.2; Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 991 (1970); Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of
%Fair Use" in the Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790, 807 (1975).
12. See text accompanying notes 44-50 infra.
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right of the public to be fully informed.13 In the copyright infringement
case of Meeropol v. Nizer,'4 however, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, when presented with the opportunity, re-
fused to recognize or apply this direct public interest qualification.
Instead, the court relied upon traditional copyright law concepts and
found plaintiffs' economic interest in the copyright superior to defend-
ants' claim of fair use.' 5 The court's holding represents a distinct depar-
ture from the trend toward recognition of a direct public interest
qualification that had begun to emerge in the Second Circuit.'
6
The Meeropol case concerned The Implosion Conspiracy, 17 a book
about the Ethel and Julius Rosenberg espionage trial, in which the au-
thor, Louis Nizer, quoted from twenty-eight letters that had been pub-
lished previously in a copyrighted book.'8 The present owners of the
copyright to this book of letters (the Rosenbergs' children, Robert and
Michael Meeropol) brought suit in federal district court against Nizer
and his publishers alleging that Nizer had infringed their statutory cop-
yright.' 9 In response, Nizer and his codefendants asserted that their use
of the quotations was both fair and reasonable and, therefore, permissi-
ble under the fair use doctrine, and on this ground moved for summary
judgment.20 After comparing the two books in question, the district
court concluded that defendants had successfully established the de-
fense of fair use2 and granted their motion for summary judgment.2
13. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
14. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978).
15. Id at 1070.
16. Though the Second Circuit had not adopted an express public interest qualification, the
court had begun to give more consideration to the public interest and had revealed some inclina-
tion to consider the first amendment's relation to the copyright laws. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec.,
Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978).
17. L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1973).
18. THE DEATH HOUSE LETTERS OF ETHEL AND JULIUS ROSENBERG (1953).
19. 560 F.2d at 1063. The original complaint also alleged invasion of privacy and defama-
tion and infringement of common law copyright. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the dis-
missal of these claims. Id.
20. Id. at 1064. Defendants' original motion for summary judgment was denied without
prejudice. 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Defendants subsequently renewed their
motion for summary judgment on the basis of an expanded record. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1205
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
As additional defenses, defendants asserted that a significant part of the allegedly appropri-
ated material was already in the public domain, that plaintiffs were not the true copyright owners,
and that plaintiffs should be barred by laches from bringing the action. 361 F. Supp. at 1065.
21. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
22. Id. at 1215. Plaintiffs waived their right to trial by jury against defendants Nizer and
Doubleday & Co., Inc. but not as to defendant Fawcett Publications, Inc., id at 1211, leading the
trial court to find that the fair use defense was available to Nizer and Doubleday & Co., Inc., both
as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.
COPYPIGHT
In analyzing the fair use issue, the court gave primary consideration to
the fact that the public interest in understanding all facets of the Rosen-
berg case would be served by publication of Nizer's book.23 The poten-
tially adverse effect of the use on the future marketability of the
copyrighted letters was not considered sufficient to preclude defendants
from invoking fair use as a defense.24
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, disagreed
with the trial court's resolution of this apparent conflict between the
respective interests of the public and the copyright owners. Rejecting
the trial court's finding that the public's interest in the historical event
was sufficient to establish the fair use defense regardless of the apparent
economic harm to the copyright owners,25 the court reversed the grant
of summary judgment in defendants' favor and remanded the case.26
The court of appeals' decision is consistent with the traditional ap-
plication of the fair use doctrine. Though originally developed as a
means of qualifying the exclusive rights of the copyright holder and
protecting the interest of the public in the dissemination of learning
and culture,27 the doctrine of fair use was never intended to benefit the
public welfare at the expense of the copyright owner's economic inter-
ests.28 In determining whether the use made of copyrighted material in
a particular case is a fair use, the courts generally have considered a
number of factors; 29 it is evident from the case law, however, that the
ultimate consideration is whether the unauthorized use tends to
diminish or prejudice the potential marketability of the copyrighted
23. Id at 1207.
24. Id at 1210.
25. 560 F.2d at 1070.
26. Id at 1071.
27. Cohen, supra note 3, at 49.
28. See generally cases cited note 10 supra.
29. The factors listed by the Second Circuit in Meeropol are the same as those found in the
recent codification of the fair use doctrine at 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977):
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
560 F.2d at 1069.
Commentators on the fair use doctrine have suggested various sets of criteria that are essen-
tially variations of the four factors listed above. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPY-
RIGHT 309-10 (2d ed. 1960); Cohen, supra note 3, at 53; Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI.
L. REv. 203, 213 (1954). These lists have not been particularly helpful, however, because the
criteria are defined only in general terms without specification of their relative weights. See
Comment, Copyright Fair Use-Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 87.
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material.30 Consideration of the purpose and character of the use has
sometimes served to broaden the application of the fair use exception
in the case of so-called "scholarly" works.3' It has been acknowledged
that the public's interest in the advancement of such fields as science,
law, medicine, history and biography often can be served only through
the use of previously copyrighted materials.32  This public interest fac-
tor, however, has not been found sufficient to support alone the defense
of fair use when the subsequent scholarly work might decrease the po-
tential value of the copyrighted work:33 a use having such an effect can-
not be "fair" to the copyright owner because it undermines the
economic incentive to discovery and creation that is the very basis of
the quasi-monopolistic copyright system.34
Until the Meeropol case, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit had appeared to favor recognition of a direct public
interest factor as a possible defense in a copyright infringement ac-
tion." In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. ,36 the court
gave scant consideration to the possibility that the future market for
copyrighted magazine articles about Howard Hughes might be dimin-
ished by the unauthorized use of the articles in a subsequent biogra-
phy.37 Instead, the court turned its attention to the nature of the
materials, focusing on the issues of whether the copying work would
serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information and
whether its preparation required some use of previously copyrighted
materials.38 Though the Rosemont court couched its opinion in terms
30. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 145, at 646; A. LATMAN, supra note 6, at 783; Sobel,
supra note 6, at 53.
31. See Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955),
a'd sub noma. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equal? divided
Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); A. LATMAN, supra note 66, at 793.
32. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
33. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
34. See note 78 infra.
35. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964).
36. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
37. Id at 310-11. The Rosemont court did not disregard the economic harm criterion en-
tirely. Rather, the court maintained that the publication of the biography had not lessened the
value of the copyrighted magazine articles. This position has been criticized for failing to take
into account the possibility that the copyright owners could have used the articles in publishing a
subsequent biography of their own. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 145 at 646-47; Sobel,
supra note 6, at 57.
38. 366 F.2d at 307.
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of fair use,39 commentators were quick to see that the decision repre-
sented an aberrational extension of the fair use doctrine.40 It is evident
that defendants' copying of the magazine articles about Hughes did not
constitute fair use4 ' within the traditional definition of that trouble-
some term.42 The decision is best understood as the adoption of a direct
public interest factor.43
The origin of this direct public interest qualification is not certain.
The court in Rosemont relied heavily on the constitutional purpose of
the copyright statute,' but because public interest traditionally has not
been recognized as one of the express criteria for determining the avail-
ability of the fair use defense,45 it seems doubtful that this innovation
can be said to stem from the copyright clause of the Constitution.46 In
addition to setting forth the purpose for copyright, the copyright clause
specifically empowers Congress to grant "to Authors. . .the exclusive
Right to their respective writings."'47 In light of the legislative history of
the Copyrights Act48 and the fact that the fair use doctrine has been
codified,4 9 it must be presumed that the traditional judicial interpreta-
tion and application of the fair-use doctrine represents what Congress
believes to be the proper balance between the constitutional purpose of
promoting the arts and sciences and the broad power conferred by the
Constitution for serving that purpose.50
Another possible source of the direct public interest qualification,
one that is not within the power of Congress to affect, is the first
amendment.5' To the extent that the public's right to be fully informed
39. Id at 306-11.
40. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 9.24, at 28.28; Sobel, supra note 6, at 54.
41. See note 7 supra. There can be little doubt that the unauthorized use of the Hughes
material had a detrimental effect on its future economic value.
42. In Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939), the court stated that
"the issue of fair use. . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."
43. See Sobel, supra note 6, at 61.
44. See 366 F.2d at 307.
45. See note 29 suora.
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quoted in note I supra.
47. Id
48. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); S. REP,. No. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. REP. No. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967).
49. Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §
107 (West 1977)).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,
95 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978).
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, § 2 provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
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regarding matters of general import is threatened by the literal applica-
tion of the copyright laws, the first amendment may be invoked to pro-
tect the free dissemination of information and commentary on public
issues.5 2 Such an extrapolation of the first amendment would be consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's interpretation and effectuation of the
first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press.
5 3
The Supreme Court has revealed an intent to construe strictly any
law that might have a chilling effect on the first amendment "'in its
attempt to secure the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources.' - Likewise, the Court has in-
dicated, by implication, that in order for the express guarantees of free
speech and press to have any real meaning, a fundamental right to re-
ceive such information must be recognized." These principles reveal
the clear intent of the Supreme Court to remove any unnecessary
shackles from the first amendment. 6 Applying these principles to the
copyright laws, the primary issue becomes one of determining to what
52. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d at 311 (Lombard, C.J.,
concurring). But Sf McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court dismissed defendants' first amendment argument, insofar as it was distin-
guishable from traditional fair use defense, as "flying in the face of established law").
53. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
55. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). The Court's holding, only im-
plicit in the majority opinion, was expressly formulated by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion. Id at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), defendants were sued for libel
after publishing a political advertisement that allegedly contained inaccurate information con-
cerning plaintiff. The Court reversed the judgment in plaintiff's favor because there had been no
showing that prior to publication defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the infor-
mation was false. The Court held that without proof of scienter such a judgment would have a
chilling effect on first amendment rights. Id at 266.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), defendants were sued for violating plaintiff's statu-
tory right of privacy by reporting that a highly fictionalized play accurately portrayed an actual
experience in plaintiff's life. Again, however, the Court reversed the judgment in plaintiffs favor,
holding that "the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the
[statutory right of privacy] to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of
proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth." Id at 387-88.
In Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Court declared unconstitutional §
305(a) of the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-793, §
305(a), 76 Stat. 833, that required addressees of "Communist political propaganda" to submit a
written request for delivery. The Court held that the statute was "an unconstitutional abridgment
of the addressee's First Amendment rights." 381 U.S. at 307 (emphasis added). In his concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan emphasized that the addressees were asserting "First Amendment
claims in their own right," claims premised on the implicit fundamental right to receive publica-
tions, a right that is necessary to make the express guarantees of free speech and press meaningful.
Id at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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extent the rights of the copyright owner will be allowed to encroach
upon the "community right to hear."5 7
It is quite unlikely that the first amendment was intended to nega-
tive completely the protection afforded all copyrighted material that
happens to be of interest to the public. 8 Indeed, a broad application of
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech in the public inter-
est area would undermine the very foundation of the Copyrights Act,
for copyrighted works typically are of interest to the public in one way
or another. To allow unrestricted infringement of these works would
result in the destruction of the economic incentive to create, publish
and distribute copyrightable materials that might in any way be of
benefit to the public welfare, and the "community right to hear"
eventually would become a right without meaning. 9
Such a crippling application of the first amendment to the copy-
right laws is, however, unnecessary. The historical qualifications of a
copyright owner's exclusive rights more often than not have been uti-
lized successfully to achieve a proper balance between the public's
interest in the growth of learning and culture and the copyright owner's
interest in preserving the economic value of his work.6" Because the
facts and ideas set forth in a copyrighted work are not in themselves
copyrightable,61 and because the copyrighted work itself may be used
in a fair and reasonable manner,62 the public's interests can usually be
served without depriving the copyright owner of his just remun-
eration.6 3
There are certain types of copyrighted materials, however, that
cannot be reduced to an assortment of facts or ideas because it is the
form of expression and not merely the substance that is meaningful.64
57. See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 989 (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-28
(1965)) (the first amendment intended to define "a community right to hear" and not "an individ-
ual right to speak").
58. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967) ("the right to communicate
information of public interest is not 'unconditional' ").
59. See Sobel, su~vra note 6, at 78-79 (public interest best served ultimately by sound system
of copyright protection).
60. For a general review of the fair use case law, see 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 145, and
Cohen, supra note 3.
61. See A. LATMAN, supra note 6; Sobel, supra note 6.
62. See M. NIMMER, supra note 7.
63. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH
CONG., IST SESS., supra note 3, at 5-6.
64. In other words, the copyrighted material cannot be used in a distilled form and maintain
its value; the part which is to be appropriated must be copied verbatim. The fair use doctrine
allows for this type of use provided certain criteria are satisfied. See note 29 supra. If the fair
use criteria cannot be satisfied, however, the copyright owner's monopoly becomes absolute.
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As examples, Professor Nimmer lists such graphic works as the Mona
Lisa, Michelangelo's Moses and the Zapruder film of President Ken-
nedy's assassination;65 arguably this category should include certain lit-
erary works as well.66 For works of this nature, there is potentially a
direct conflict between the copyright owner's quasi-monopolistic rights
and the public's right to the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion and commentary because under the traditional interpretation of
the fair use doctrine the copyright owner has the right to prohibit any
use of his copyrighted material that might diminish its future marketa-
bility.67 When traditional copyright qualifications are inadequate to
protect the public's interests, a direct public interest qualification, pre-
mised on the first amendment, should be invoked to prevent the sup-
pression of information or commentary that might enhance the public
welfare, but that cannot be made available to the public in an effective
manner without the use of previously copyrighted material.68
The first essential element of this direct public interest qualifica-
tion is that there must be some legitimate purpose for using the copy-
righted material.69 Generally, this requirement should be easy to
satisfy. Though it is possible that copyrighted material may be appro-
priated for an improper purpose, such as commercial exploitation, any
use of the copyrighted material that is intended to contribute to the
intrinsic value of the copying work should qualify as a legitimate pur-
pose.
Obviously, if the subsequent researcher cannot accomplish his purpose in an effective manner
without a proscribed use of the copyrighted material, the public will be denied the benefit of that
researcher's work. The problem is not that the copyrighted material is not directly available to
the public, but that the public may be denied the benefit to be gained by a particular use of the
copyrighted material in a subsequent work.
65. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 9.232 at 28.22-28.23. The unauthorized use of the
Zapruder film was the subject of litigation in Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66. Provided that verbatim copying is necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate
purpose, there is no logical reason for excluding literary works. This should not create problems
in the areas of poetry, fiction or drama since the purpose for using such works can be strictly
scrutinized. For instance, limited quotation from such works for the purpose of literary criticism
and parody has been allowed under the traditional fair use doctrine. See Cohen, supra note 3.
But wholesale appropriation probably would not be allowed even under the more liberal direct
public interest qualification because such a use would serve the same purpose as the original, and
thus the only motivation for such copying would be personal profit.
67. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
68. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978); Goldstein, supra note 11, at 994.
69. Cf. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938)
(portion of scientific treatise appropriated for purely commercial purpose of promoting the sale of
defendant's cigarettes held not legitimate purpose).
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The trial court in Meeropol v. Nizer, for example, expressed no
difficulty in finding that there was a legitimate purpose for using the
Rosenbergs' letters.7" The court indicated that the letters themselves
were part of the historical record of this important event and that any
serious discussion of the case would be incomplete without some refer-
ence to them.7 In addition, the trial court found that the letters clearly
were used to describe the thoughts and feelings of the Rosenbergs in
relation to their trial and sentence.72
On the other hand, the court of appeals in Meeropol expressed
considerable doubt regarding the legitimacy of defendants' purpose for
using the letters.73 Noting that the letters were prominently featured in
promotional material for defendants' book,7 4 the court found that the
letters may have been used for purposes of commercial exploitation.75
It seems, however, that the court was confusing commercial motivation
with commercial exploitation.76 As the court conceded, the mere fact
that an unauthorized use of copyrighted material is commercially moti-
vated is not a sufficient reason for disallowing an otherwise valid fair
use defense.77 The specific promotional activities are merely elements
of the overall commercial motivation 8.7 The use of the letters in promo-
tional advertisements was not alone a proper basis for questioning ei-
ther the legitimacy of using the letters in the book or the intrinsic value
of the book itself.
The second essential element of the direct public interest qualifica-
tion is that the copying work be of interest to the public. 79 This does
not mean that the copying work must represent a significant scientific
or cultural achievement; indeed, the trial court in Meeropol found that
The Implosion Conspiracy could be of some benefit to the public wel-
fare even though it was written for a popular audience and with a
70. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
71. Id at 1212, 1214.
72. Id at 1214.
73. 560 F.2d at 1069-71.
74. Id at 1071.
75. Id
76. Id at 1069.
77. Id
78. The copyright system is based on providing an economic incentive for the creation and
publication of new works. The Second Circuit has expressly recognized this underlying premise.
See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d at 307; Berlin v. E.C. Publica-
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
79. This is related to the traditional requirements of the fair use doctrine, see note 29 suprg
and it is of special importance to the direct public interest qualification. See text accompanying
notes 44-59 supra.
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commercial motivation. 0 So long as there is some public interest in
the copying work, this requirement is satisfied.
The final and most critical element is necessity: only if the purpose
for using the copyrighted material can be accomplished by no means
other than exact appropriation can the unauthorized use come within
the sanction of the direct public interest qualification. If other means
exist, then the interests of the public can be adequately protected with-
out invoking any additional qualification of the copyright owner's
rights. The trial court in Meeropol found that the only effective means
of using the letters to accomplish the intended purposes was to quote
from them directly.8' In so finding, the court expressly dismissed the
suggestion that the thoughts and feelings embodied in the letters could
have been presented effectively without copying their expression verba-
tim.8 2 In other words, the court found that verbatim copying was
necessary to protect adequately the public's interest in hearing what
Mr. Nizer and his publishers had to say about the Rosenberg case.
The propriety of the trial court in Meeropol finding necessity on
defendants' motion for summary judgment is, however, open to ques-
tion. Though there is no reason to question the legitimacy or sincerity
of defendants' purposes in using the letters, 3 it would seem that rea-
sonable men might differ concerning whether verbatim copying of the
letters was really necessary to the accomplishment of those purposes.
The defendants first asserted necessity in the use of the letters as histor-
ical facts in themselves.8 4 It must be conceded that quotation would be
necessary if the letters were found to be an integral component of the
historical event. But certainly it is not clear that the letters could prop-
erly be considered analogous to historical facts.8 5 Because the letters of
80. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For example, the trial court found that
Nizer's book could serve as valuable source material for future studies of the Rosenbergs' case.
81. Id at 1214.
82. Id at 1212. The trial court also found that the use of the letters was properly limited to
the accomplishment of the purposes. Id at 1214.
83. Defendants set out the following purposes for using the letters in their book:
(1) as historical facts in themselves for the reason that they were an integral part of an
international campaign to secure clemency; (2) to give the reader an insight into those
two public figures as individuals. . . whose writing achieved a lasting eloquence; and (3)
to provide an emotional base to support Nizer's own view that capital punishment in that
case was unwarranted.
Petition for Certiorari at 6, Nizer v. Meeropol, 98 S. Ct. 927 (1978) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review).
84. See note 83 supra.
85. Judge Tyler, the trial judge originally assigned to this case, expressed doubt concerning
whether "letters stand on the same footing as 'historical facts', which are the product of research
and in turn form the basis for subsequent works." 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This
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public figures are copyrightable,16 while historical facts are not, 7 it
would seem that the two are not analogous. If they were, the letters
could be used without restriction, and the copyright on them would be
meaningless.
Defendants' second alleged purpose was to provide insight into the
character of the Rosenbergs.88 Direct quotation from the letters may
indeed have been the most effective means of accomplishing that pur-
pose, but whether it was the only effective means is not so certain. It is
probably true that reference to certain of the Rosenbergs' letters would
be a necessary element in any serious book on their trial; 9 whether
such references would require verbatim copying, however, is a genuine
issue of fact that should be decided by the trier of fact after careful
comparison of the materials in question. Particularly with regard to
literary works, only in the most unusual cases will the need for exact
copying be so evident as to warrant summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.
The same holds true for defendants' third purpose,90 the establish-
ment of an emotional basis for the author's view on capital punishment
in the Rosenbergs' case. Though the quotations may have heightened
the emotional impact of this theme, only a careful examination of the
two works can reveal whether the same sentiments could not have been
expressed effectively by paraphrasing the content of the letters.
Thus it appears that even if Meeropol had been decided in a juris-
diction in which the direct public interest qualification was recognized,
because the necessity element raised a genuine issue of fact the court of
appeals' decision to remand would have been appropriate. This is not
to say that the use of the letters in this instance was not necessary. On
the contrary, there is good reason to believe that verbatim copying was
the only effective means of accomplishing at least one, if not all, of the
author's purposes for using the letters. But not until this issue is finally
resolved can the direct public interest qualification be invoked as a de-
was one reason Judge Tyler denied defendants' original motion for summary judgment. Judge
Gagliardi, who succeeded Judge Tyler when he resigned from the bench, however, went so far as
to indicate that the letters were at least analogous to historical facts. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1211
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
86. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Note, PersonalLetters.: In
Need of a Law of Their Own, 44 IowA L. REv. 705 (1959).
87. 560 F.2d at 1070. See also A. LATMAN,upra note 6, at 784-85.
88. See note 83 supra.
89. Even Judge Tyler was willing to concede that some reference to the letters would be
required. 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
90. See note 83 supra.
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fense. Unfortunately, in Meeropol the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, by restricting its analysis of the case to the strict criteria of the
traditional fair use doctrine, showed no interest in recognizing the pub-
lic interest qualification. 9' Because the fair use doctrine was never in-
tended to benefit the public welfare at the expense of the copyright
owner's economic interests,92 the court could not so easily dismiss the
possibility of economic harm to the copyright owner.93 And, having
found the possibility of such harm to exist, the court of appeals was
compelled to reverse the district court's summary judgment award.
If on remand defendants' use of the letters can be proven to have
diminished the future marketability of the copyrighted work, then the
fair use defense will be of no avail to defendants even if it can also be
proven that the copyrighted material could not be used in an effective
manner without infringing the copyright.94 If this is to be the case, the
public's right to hear a critical part of Nizer's discussion of the Rosen-
berg trial will be subordinated to the Meeropols' economic interest in
exerting total control over the copyrighted letters.95 It is to avoid such a
constitutionally anomalous result96 that the courts need to recognize
this direct public interest factor as a legitimate and necessary qualifica-
tion of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
Provided the material is of such a type that the public's interest
therein cannot be adequately served without infringing the copyright,
91. See text accompanying notes 80 & 81 supra.
The court attempted to distinguish its earlier decision in Rosemont on the grounds that plain-
tiffs in that case had not come into court with clean hands and that the amount of copying in
Rosemont was quantitatively less than that in Meeropol. 560 F.2d at 1069. It seems clear, how-
ever, that by unequivocally relying on the strict criteria of the fair use doctrine in Meeropol, the
court was implicitly rejecting the underlying basis of the Rosemont decision.
92. See generall, cases cited note 10 supra.
93. "A key issue in fair use cases is whether the defendant's work tends to diminish or
prejudice the potential sale of plaintiffs work." 560 F.2d at 1070; see note 10 and text accompany-
ing notes 32-40 supra.
The trial court did not disregard the economic harm factor entirely. It merely held that
economic harm was not necessarily the determinative issue. 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214-15
(S,D.N.Y. 1976).
Because of the court of appeals' decision in this case, it is doubtful that the issue of necessity
in Meeropol will be litigated on remand. Limited by law of the case principles to the traditional
copyright qualifications, defendants probably will not be allowed to litigate the issue of necessity
directly, though it may come into play as a collateral issue in the fair use defense. Nor is it likely
that the issue will be raised again on appeal, as the facts of the case are such that the traditional
fair use defense should result in a judgment in defendants' favor. Because of the nature of de-
fendants' use, it seems doubtful that plaintiffs will be able to prove a likelihood of economic harm.
94. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
95. Though the public may have access to the Rosenbergs' letters, they will not have access
to that part of Nizer's discussion of the case that depends on the use of the letters.
96. See text accompanying notes 51-57, 67 & 68 supra.
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the benefit to be gained from allowing the free dissemination of infor-
mation and commentary far outweighs the possible economic harm to
the copyright owner. The public's right to be informed must be the
ultimate concern. "We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess
in which the public can be checkmated.
9 7
STEVEN L. HOARD
Corporations-Singer v. Magnavox Co.: An Expansion of
Fiduciary Duty in Freezeout Mergers Under the Delaware
Long-Form Merger Statute
Under the law of some states a corporation holding a majority eq-
uity interest in another company may merge the two corporations and
provide in the merger agreement that certain shareholders be paid cash,
rather than securities in the resulting entity, for their interest in the old
corporation.' In these mergers, denominated "freezeouts,"2 the fiduci-
ary duties governing the relationship between majority and minority
stockholders are rooted in state law In Singer v. Magnavox Co.,4 a
recent decision concerning shareholder fiduciary duties, the Delaware
97. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675, 679 (Ist Cir. 1967).
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§
901, 902 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977).
2. Freezeouts can occur in various contexts. For example, merger freezeouts include the
situation in which the controlling shareholders of a public corporation who wish to "go private"
form a second company and capitalize it with their equity interest in the public corporation. This
new "parent" then merges with its public subsidiary with the terms of the merger providing for the
elimination of the equity interest of the minority, often on a cash-out basis. A second type of
freezeout occurs when one corporation, by tender offer or otherwise, attempts to acquire the ma-
jority interest in a business with which it was previously unaffiliated. After the requisite propor-
tional interest is obtained, the acquiring corporation merges the acquired company with itself or
its wholly-owned subsidiary, the terms of the merger providing for the elimination of the minority
shareholders of the target corporation. See Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed
Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487, 491-96 (1976).
3. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which the Supreme Court held
that in short-form mergers the fiduciary relationship between stockholders is a matter of state
concern. Specifically, Santa Fe rejected the contention that § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977), require a proper
business purpose to exist before a short-form merger comporting with state law will be valid under
federal law. The Court suggested that the reasoning behind its holding is also applicable to long-
form mergers. 430 U.S. at 478.
4. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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Supreme Court held that it is a breach of fiduciary duty under state law
for a controlling shareholder to cause such a merger through utilization
of Delaware's long-form merger statute' when the sole purpose of the
merger is to cash out minority stockholders.
6
The controversy in Singer began in 1974 when North American
Philips Corporation (North American) incorporated a wholly-owned
subsidiary, North American Philips Development Corporation (Devel-
opment), for the purpose of making a tender offer for the outstanding
common shares of Magnavox. After overcoming the initial resistance
of the Magnavox directors,7 the offer succeeded with Development ob-
taining approximately 84.1% of outstanding Magnavox common stock.
Development next incorporated a subsidiary, T.M.C. Development
Corporation (T.M.C.), and proposed to effect a merger between T.M.C.
and Magnavox under the long-form merger provision of the Delaware
Code. The Magnavox board unanimously approved the proposed
merger agreement,' which provided that the remaining public stock-
holders of Magnavox would be "cashed-out."9
5. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Supp. 1977). This section is the primary merger provi-
sion of the Delaware Code. It provides that two or more Delaware corporations may merge into
a single corporation or consolidate into a new entity. The provision requires that the board of
directors of each corporation approve an agreement that stipulates the merger terms and that this
agreement subsequently be approved by shareholders holding a majority of outstanding shares
entitled to vote on the matter. To be included in the merger agreement are provisions regarding
the manner in which shares of the constituent corporation will be converted or eliminated.
Section 25 l(b)(4) provides that the merger agreement will state:
[T]he manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares
or other securities of the corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or consolida-
tion and, if any shares . . . are not to be converted. . . the cash, property, rights or
securities of any other corporation which the holders of such shares are to receive ....
Id § 251(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
The long-form statute is currently more permissive than as originally written with respect to
the types of consideration that can be paid for a stockholder's interest in a premerger corporation.
For a brief history of the development of Delaware's long-form statute, see Balotti, The Elimina-
tion of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General Corporation Law of
Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63 (1976).
6. 380 A.2d at 980. The supreme court also interpreted the Delaware Securities Act, DEL.
CODE tit. 6, § 7303 (1974), to be a state Blue Sky law applicable only to transactions subject to
Delaware jurisdiction. It held that out-of-state transactions are not covered by the Act even if the
company involved were incorporated in Delaware. 380 A.2d at 981-82.
7. The opposition was suspended after agreement had been reached to increase the original
per-share offer and to contract with 16 Magnavox officers for two-year employment contracts.
See 380 A.2d at 971.
8. Id. at 972. At this time Development effectively controlled the Magnavox board: four of
the nine directors were also directors of North American and three others had employment con-
tracts.
9. The cash-out price was $9.00 per share and book value was estimated at $10.16 per share.
This discrepancy was one ground on which the merger was attacked. See id. at 972. Cash
freezeouts are discussed in note 2 supra.
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After the required stockholders' vote, plaintiffs, minority share-
holders in Magnavox, filed suit seeking nullification of the consolida-
tion as well as compensatory damages. They alleged that the merger
was fraudulent because it did not serve any business purpose other than
the forced exclusion of public stockholders from an equity position in
Magnavox, that the price offered was inadequate and therefore consti-
tuted a breach of duty by Development, the majority shareholder, and
that the merger violated the antifraud provision of the Delaware Secur-
ities Act.10 The lower court determined that plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1 The supreme court
reversed, holding that a majority shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to a
minority and that it is a breach of that duty when a long-form merger is
effected for the sole purpose of eliminating a noncontrol interest.12
Rather, before a minority may be eliminated in a long-form merger, a
proper business purpose for the combination must exist. 13
This holding is significant because of its emphasis on and redefini-
tion of the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders. Delaware's long-
form merger statute does not explicitly require, and the state's courts
generally have not implied, the necessity of a proper business purpose
as a precondition of the validity of any merger.' 4  The requirement
10. 380 A.2d at 972.
11. See 367 A.2d 1349, 1358, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1976).
12. 380 A.2d at 980. The fiduciary duty was predicated, the court found, on the majority's
responsibility toward plaintiffs' investment interest in Magnavox. Significantly, the court held
that this interest extended not merely to the value of the investment but also to its form. There-
fore, it found that offering a minority merely a fair price for its shares in a cash-out merger would
not satisfy the fiduciary obligation, and that defendant's duty was not lessened by the availability
to the minority of the right to elect an appraisal. For a discussion of statutory appraisal rights, see
notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text infra.
13. See 380 A.2d at 978-79. The court did not find it necessary to determine which corpora-
tion's business interest should be served in the merger. But in Tanzer v. International Gen. In-
dus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), a case decided after Singer and involving a cash-out long-
form merger, the Delaware Supreme Court held that one looked to the business rationale of the
parent corporation. The court, however, objected to phrasing the standard in terms of business
purpose since it is the parent corporation's status as a stockholder that gives it the right to vote its
own interest. Id. at 1123. Although this distinction is useful for a conceptual understanding of
the Tanzer decision, its practical importance in determining the legality of mergers seems prob-
lematical because some bona fide business purpose is a prerequisite to merger validity. See id. at
1124.
14. The Singer court cited two unreported Delaware cases that according to the court sug-
gest that a business justification is required in long-form merger cases. 380 A.2d at 975 n.5 (dis-
cussing Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., No. 4945 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 1975); Pennsylvania
Mut. Fund, Inc. v. Todiunter Int'l, Inc., No. 4845 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1975)).
One federal court also has discussed business purpose in the context of a long-form merger.
In Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aft'd, 521
F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975), plaintiff sought to prevent a merger between two Delaware corporations
on various grounds, including an allegation that the merger served no business function. Apply-
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that there be a business purpose other than the elimination of a minor-
ity interest in long-form mergers runs counter to the general trend of
Delaware statutory and case law which has, in general, encouraged
consolidations by placing progressively fewer restraints on majority
shareholders desiring to effect corporate mergers. 15
The existence of merger provisions in the Delaware Code has been
considered by courts to be evidence of a state policy in favor of facili-
tating mergers. 16  Because the merger statutes are considered part of
every corporate charter, stockholders purchase shares with notice of the
provisions, a fact courts have cited in dismissing merger challenges. 7
This interpretation of the policy of the statutes has meant that fewer
limitations have been placed on controlling shareholders when making
merger decisions than have been placed on them when making other
decisions regarding corporate assets or functions.' 8
ing Delaware law, the court entered judgment for defendants, finding that there was a valid busi-
ness purpose for the merger but also stressing that a minority did not possess an absolute right to
its shares; therefore, it could be cashed out for a fair price. Id. at 1403.
While the Grimes court purported to apply Delaware law, it never made a specific finding
that the state law required a business purpose. Rather, the court apparently considered the busi-
ness purpose of the merger to be relevant on the basis of Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d
563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), a case in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit construed a Georgia statute similiar to Delaware's long-form provision. The Bryan court
concluded that under Georgia law a control group could not force a merger for the sole purpose of
eliminating a minority shareholder. Unlike Singer and Grimes, Bryan did not involve the attempt
of one corporation to take over another, rather, it involved the attempt of several shareholders of a
close corporation to freeze out another shareholder. For an analysis of the Grimes court's appli-
cation of the Bryan business purpose test, see Comment, Corporate Freeze-Outs Effected by
Mferger: The Search for a Rule, 37 U. PrTr. L. REv. 115, 121-24 (1975).
On the other hand, some cases and commentators have asserted that business purpose is not a
consideration under Delaware's merger law. See MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F.
Supp. 462, 466 (D. Del. 1943); Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (1961);
Arsht, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts Under Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAW. 1495, 1497 (1977);
Balotti, supra note 5, at 77.
15. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940); Bruce
v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961).
17. See Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 334, 11 A.2d 331, 338 (1940).
18. These nonmerger cases often involve majority shareholder action relating to the control
of corporate assets and internal corporate functioning. An early decision held that while the
decision to sell corporate assets is a shareholder determination, the terms of the sale must be fair
to the corporation. See Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 11,
120 A. 486, 490 (1923). A subsequent case hypothesized that even if the terms of sale are fair, a
court of equity might enjoin a merger when a control group attempts to freeze out a minority by
selling corporate assets to themselves. See Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 323-
24, 147 A. 257, 260 (1929).
More generally, Delaware courts have held that corporate mechanisms may not be used to
perpetuate corporate control at another's expense. Thus, the court in Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967), cancelled an issuance of stock that was
designed to frustrate plaintiff's successful tender bid for a majority of defendant's outstanding
shares. See also Petty v. Peantech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975); Yasik v. Wachtel,
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The liberal attitude displayed by courts toward mergers has been
reinforced by the existence of appraisal rights for stockholders who dis-
sent from a merger.' 9 To request an appraisal, a shareholder must
vote against the proposal and file a petition in court. The court then
determines the value of the dissenting stockholder's interest in the
premerger corporation. 20  This appraisal right is significant because it
has often been held to be an adequate remedy for a shareholder dissat-
isfied with a merger.21
The favorable predisposition toward corporate combinations,
however, has been tempered by various limitations on a control group's
right to force a merger in contravention of a minority's interest. Early
cases held that a merger would be enjoined when a minority estab-
lished that a control group had engaged in fraudulent practices.
Before the long-form statute provided for cash payments for eliminated
shares, a control faction could formulate unfavorable merger terms and
virtually assure that dissatisfied stockholders would invoke their ap-
praisal rights and be paid cash for their interests in the premerger com-
pany. Notwithstanding the appraisal remedy it was held that in the
presence of such fraud a court of equity would enjoin the merger.22
Moreover, courts went beyond the requirement of actual fraud and rec-
ognized a claim for relief based upon a showing of "constructive
fraud," a type of fraud that results from a reckless but nondeceptive
undervaluation of a minority's interest. 23
25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941). In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del.
1971), Chris-Craft's technical compliance with Delaware law in changing the annual shareholders'
meeting date was held to be insufficient to prevent a preliminary injunction from issuing when the
change was designed to inhibit plaintiff's efforts to solicit proxies for a rival slate of directors. But
see American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (1957). The
above cases illustrate the principle that in non-merger situations, notwithstanding compliance with
technical statutory requirements, Delaware courts will carefully scrutinize majority shareholder
action to ensure that the noncontrol group is dealt with fairly.
19. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
20. The statute provides that the determination of value should exclude any increment in
value arising from the merger itself. Id. § 262(f) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
21. See note 28 iAfra.
22. See, e.g., Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931).
23. See id. at 56-57, 156 A. at 187; accord, Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127,
133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (1943); MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 A.
396 (1928). One court suggested that the discrepancy between actual and proffered value must
shock the court's conscience in order to reach the level of constructive fraud. See Bruce v. E.L.
Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 82, 174 A.2d 29, 30 (1961). In cases in which constructive fraud is
alleged in mergers involving previously unaffiliated corporations, it has been held that the burden
of proof is on the dissenting shareholders to show manifestly unfair terms. See Cole v. National
Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 58, 156 A. 183, 188 (1931); c. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (burden of proof shifted in
interested mergers). For an illustration of some of the factors a court will consider in determining
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In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,24 the seminal case on fiduci-
ary obligations of majority stockholders in interested mergers, the Del-
aware Supreme Court held that a corporation standing on both sides of
a merger has the burden of proving the "entire fairness" of it.2 5  The
phrase "entire fairness" was not expressly defined by the Sterling court,
but was employed as the standard to determine whether defendant cor-
poration had used its position to undervalue the minority's interest. In
equating fairness with value, however, there is no indication that the
Sterling court intended fairness to include the necessity of a proper
business purpose for the merger; indeed, other cases under Delaware
law have held that business necessity is not a consideration under the
state's merger statutes. 6
Subsequent cases involving interested long-form mergers have
been inconsistent in applying the fiduciary obligation enunciated in
Sterling. At times courts have not recognized the applicability of the
obligation to prove fairness,27 while other courts have diluted the im-
pact of Sterling by implying that the existence of statutory appraisal
mitigates a parent corporation's burden of establishing fairness.2 8 This
relative share valuation in proposed mergers, see Bastian v. Bournes, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 683-84
(Del. Ch. 1969), aj'dper curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970).
24. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Sterling involved a merger challenge in
which minority shareholders attacked the proposed share exchange ratio offered by the parent
corporation.
25. This fiduciary duty was derived from cases that had construed the duties of corporate
directors and officers toward the corporation and its shareholders. The theme that runs through-
out these cases is that officers and directors must deal fairly with the corporation and its share-
holders. Any actions by which these persons attempt to usurp corporate opportunities, bring
benefits solely to themselves, unfairly perpetuate their control over the corporation or favor one
class of stockholders over another is a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Fenton, 278
A.2d 834 (Del. 1971); Dolese Bros. v. Brown, 39 Del. Ch. 1, 157 A.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Guth v.
Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
26. See note 14 supra.
27. See Bruce v. E.L. Bruce Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961). Bruce involved an
interested merger in which a minority shareholder sought to enjoin the merger on the ground that
the proposed exchange ratio for shares was constructively fraudulent. The court dismissed the
complaint on the basis that the alleged value of plaintiff's interest was unrealistically high and
therefore constructive fraud had not been proven. The court implied that under the circum-
stances recourse to appraisal was adequate. Id. at 82, 174 A.2d at 30. In David J. Greene & Co.
v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968), however, the court followed Sterling, holding
that the minority shareholders' allegations of unfair valuation and usurpation of corporate oppor-
tunities by defendant parent corporation justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Bruce
was distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had apparently not brought the
applicability of Sterling to the court's attention. Id. at 431.
28. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971). In
Schenley the parent corporation conceded its obligation to establish fairness, but the court held
that the burden had been met when the parent had established that the price offered was not
fraudulent. Id. at 33. In so holding, the court reasoned that the parties were merely in a dispute
over value, and, because the court construed the rights of a minority stockholder in a long-form
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seeming reluctance to give full effect to the Sterling decision parallels
the Delaware Supreme Court's own interpretation of mergers under the
state's short-form merger statute.2 9 This provision provides for an ex-
pedited merger procedure when one corporation owns at least a 90%
interest in another company. Such mergers, involving one corporation
on both sides of the transaction, are by definition "interested." Yet in
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 30 the supreme court, despite
plaintiff's allegations of constructive fraud, held that in short-form
mergers the statutory appraisal right is an adequate remedy when the
only relief sought is the monetary value of an interest.31 In making the
availability of appraisal dispositive of the minority's claim, the supreme
court in Stauffer was impliedly rejecting Sterling's requirement that in
an interested merger the majority must prove fairness. Furthermore,
the court in Stauffer noted that it would be difficult to foresee a short-
form merger that could be nullified for fraud.32 The Stauffer decision is
particularly significant because of one court's holding that due to the
presence in both the long- and short-form merger statutes of provisions
allowing for cash payments of eliminated interests,33 the rights of a mi-
nority shareholder in long-form mergers are no greater than those in
short-form mergers.34 Thus, prior to Singer it appeared that some Del-
aware courts were prepared to hold that because appraisal constitutes
an adequate and complete remedy a long-form cash-out merger could
not be enjoined for fraud.
In general, a review of statutory and case law reveals several ele-
ments of Delaware corporate law that have influenced courts in deter-
mining the legality of majority stockholder action in interested long-
merger to be no greater than those in short-form mergers, appraisal was an adequate remedy for
the dissatisfied stockholders. Id. at 33, 35.
The Sterling court had not specifically addressed the interrelationship between the appraisal
remedy and the fiduciary duty of a parent corporation. At a minimum, as the Schenley court
found, Sterling requires the controlling corporation to prove the absence of fraud. A more inter-
esting question is whether the Sterling court would have required the control shareholder in
Schenley to go beyond negating the plaintiffs fraud allegations and make a positive showing of
the fundamental fairness of the merger terms. The dismissal of the merger challenge by the
Schenley court indicates that that court impliedly rejected such a stringent formulation of majori-
ty fiduciary duty.
29. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
31. Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
32. Id. But see Blraasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (1964) (motion to
dismiss challenge to short-form merger denied when plaintiff alleged fraud by parent corpora-
tion).
33. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
34. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
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form mergers. Influencing merger approval is the view that merger
statutes reflect a public policy favoring mergers and, therefore, that
mergers should only be enjoined on the basis of supervening equities.35
This predisposition has been reinforced by the tendency to view the
appraisal right as an exclusive remedy36 and by legislative acts that
have both liberalized and reduced the distinctions between the long-
and short-form merger provisions.37 On the other hand, courts have
shown a reluctance to sanction the manipulation of corporate machin-
ery for the perpetuation of a control position.38 Moreover, courts have
generally recognized in all long-form mergers that majority sharehold-
ers owe a fiduciary duty to act fairly to minority stockholders and that
the obligation is strongest when the controlling shareholder is a parent
corporation.39
In assessing the validity of a long-form merger, particularly one in
which one party is interested, it is necessary to accommodate these con-
flicting decisional factors. Cases prior to Singer reveal that the conflict
between the factors was resolved by rejecting the necessity of close
scrutiny of interested mergers and adopting the view that a minority
was dealt with fairly whenever it was paid the fair value of its interest.40
Often, appraisal was cited as an appropriate mechanism to satisfy this
latter goal. Singer, in contrast, held that a stockholder has an interest
not only in the value of his shares but also in the form of his investment
and that therefore appraisal is not an appropriate remedy in a cash-out
merger under the long-form statute. The significance of this holding is
twofold. First, while there is a recognition that a minority's interest is
not inviolable, the Delaware Supreme Court found that it could only
be abrogated for a valid business purpose and that the elimination of a
minority solely to allow the majority unfettered control does not consti-
tute such a purpose. Second, the decision may be interpreted as reaf-
firming Sterling's emphasis on the fiduciary obligations of majority
stockholders, despite contrary trends in Delaware law. Thus, the court
expanded the fiduciary obligations of controlling shareholders in cash-
out mergers under the long-form statute through the imposition of a
requirement of proper business purpose, while it simultaneously em-
35. See cases cited notes 16 & 17 supra.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. See Balotti, supra note 5.
38. See note 18 upra.
39. See notes 27 & 28 supra.
40. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text supra.
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phasized that appraisal could not serve as a substitute for fiduciary
duty.
In requiring that a business purpose exist in a long-form merger in
which a minority is to be eliminated, the Singer court arguably did not
lay an adequate basis for its decision through analysis of Delaware stat-
utory law and prior decisions. The court relied heavily on a series of
nonmerger cases that stand for the proposition that a control faction
cannot perpetuate its position at the expense of a minority even when
the noncontrol group is paid a fair value for its interest." On the basis
of these decisions the Singer court held that it is a breach of fiduciary
duty in a long-form merger for a majority shareholder to freeze out a
minority without a business justification. The applicability of prior
merger cases that had either expressed or implied that business purpose
has no function in determining the validity of mergers under Delaware
law was rejected on the ground that none of those cases involved a
cash-out merger whose sole purpose was to eliminate a minority.42 In
its rejection of the applicability of prior merger law, however, the court
neglected to address the policy of liberality toward mergers that these
decisions exemplified. This leniency, in fact, seems to have tradition-
ally distinguished the application of fiduciary standards in merger cases
from the application of such principles in other areas of corporate
life.4 3 The Singer court's reliance on nonmerger case law, therefore,
tends to obscure the true significance of the opinion, because it conceals
the degree to which the case both strengthens and expands the fiduciary
obligations recognized by the Sterling court. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of Singer to Delaware law will not go unrecognized because the
inclusion of business purpose as a component of fiduciary duty in long-
form corporate mergers is a significant departure from prior law.44
41. See 380 A.2d at 976-77. See note 18 supra for a discussion of Delaware's treatment of
shareholder fiduciary duties in nonmerger situations.
42. See 380 A.2d at 978.
43. See Balotti, supra note 5, at 74-77.
44. The court's opinion left some questions unanswered. The major unanswered question
was whose business purpose should be determinative of legality; this problem was resolved in
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), drcussedin note 13 supra.
Moreover, while some language in Singermight be construed as requiring a business purpose in
short-form mergers, the question was not decided. See 380 A.2d at 979-80. Short-form mergers
cannot automatically be presumed to involve the same fiduciary duties as long-form mergers.
The differences in the provisions governing short- and long-form mergers might indicate a legisla-
tive judgment that the rights attaching to minority stock ownership are more clearly outweighed
by corporate interests when a parent owns over 90% of its subsidiary than when a lesser interest is
held. This possibility, however, leads to the anomaly that in some instances fiduciary duty is
inversely related to degree of ownership.
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Although Singer v. Magnavox Co. does not harmonize with prior
Delaware merger law, it cannot be condemned as improperly decided.
By injecting considerations of business purpose into determinations of
merger validity, the supreme court simply recognized a factor not pre-
viously deemed important under state law. The propriety of this equi-
table decision should be assessed in terms of competing policies that
favor both mergers and protection of the investment interests of minor-
ity shareholders who wish to retain their stock in a corporation. Ac-
cordingly, the Singer decision clearly does not frustrate the state's
substantive policy of corporate flexibility that is revealed in the case
law. A corporation may still effect a merger and eliminate a minority's
equity interest with a cash or other payment, subject only to the qualifi-
cations of fairness and a proper business objective. And, while some
might contend that a minority shareholder should only be entitled to
the value of his interest,45 it seems reasonable that an individual, hav-
ing made an investment, should not be forced to sell out absent some
superior interest.46 The inadequacy of merely receiving share value is
particularly apparent in light of the possibility of majority abuse in the
valuation of a noncontrol interest and in deficiencies in statutory ap-
praisal rights.47 The requirement of a business purpose does not, of
course, eliminate the problems in either majority valuation or statutory
appraisal, but it does help assure that these mechanisms will not be
utilized to frustrate the legitimate investment goals of minority stock-
holders.48
ROBERT S. PIERCE
45. See Arsht, supra note 14. It might be reasonable to conclude that a majority share-
holder's interest varies according to the type of merger involved. A distinction might be made
between freezeouts of noncontrolling stockholders in close corporations versus those situations in
which the freezeout is incident to an acquisition attempt. A business requirement might be more
reasonable in the former type of merger. See Greene, supra note 2, at 499-502.
46. See Note, Elimination of Minority Share Interest by Merger A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L.
REv. 629 (1959).
47. Various flaws have been identified in construing a right of appraisal as a complete rem-
edy. For example, factors necessary to fairly evaluate an interest may be concealed; the costs
incurred in appraisal reduce its value as an option; and when the value of an interest is.specula-
tive, conservative results may be expected. See Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stock-
holder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. Rev. 1189, 1201-05 (1964). Moreover, when the market
value of an interest is likely to be determinative of an appraisal decision, the likelihood of a
freezeout can depress share value. See Greene, supra note 2; Solomon, Going Private. Business
Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposalsfor Re/orm, 25 BUFFALO L. Rev.
141, 158 (1975).
48. For two recent cases giving broad scope to Singer, see Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d
1372 (Del. Ch. 1978) (proposed long-form cash-out merger between Valhi and its subsidiary en-joined because Valhi's parent corporation, Contran, breached its duty of fairness in proposing the
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Health Policy-Professional Standards Review Organization
Oversight of Ambulatory Care: Can HEW Soften the
Blow?
The Medicare' and Medicaid 2 programs, created in 1965 by Con-
gress3 in an effort to make crucial health care services available to those
segments of society least able to afford them, have become increasingly
expensive to fund due primarily to the precipitously rising cost of
health care.4 Recently, another disturbing inflationary force has been
the subject of media coverage5 and congressional concern-fraud and
abuse on the parts of both the providers and the beneficiaries of medi-
cal services. After finding substantial evidence demonstrating that
health care providers participating in Medicare and Medicaid have fre-
quently and profitably employed a number of fraudulent and abusive
practices, Congress passed the Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and
Abuse Amendments6 in a comprehensive effort to rid the health care
delivery system and the federal budget of these wasteful and often un-
savory occurrences.7
In so doing, Congress placed particular emphasis on the need to
monitor the health care services provided by "Medicaid
mills"-usually inner-city group practice facilities owned and operated
by profit motivated entrepreneurs-to eliminate a number of the fraud-
merger as part of an effort to circumvent a Valhi charter provision inhibiting Valhi's ability to
merge with Contran), and Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977) (short-form merger en-
joined because of allegations that parent obtained its over 90% holding in subsidiary as result of
false representations in tender offer).
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1395nn (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
2. Id §§ 1396-1396k.
3. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 102(a), 121(a), 79 Stat. 286.
4. Between 1965 and 1974, the cost of medical care in the United States doubled. Rogers,
The Challenge of Primary Care, in DOING BETTER AND FEELING WORSE 81, 89 figure 4 (J.
Knowles ed. 1977).
5. Two separate editions of the CBS television news show "60 Minutes" presented documen-
tation illustrating such fraudulent practices as the rendering of unnecessary care, over-billing,
billing for services never rendered, and bribery and kickback schemes in laboratory-physician
relations.
6. Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91
Stat. 1175 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West Cum. Supp. 1978)).
7. See generally H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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ulent and abusive practices known to flourish there.' The method cho-
sen by Congress to alleviate these problems is elaborate and
comprehensive. Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSROs),9 previously responsible only for monitoring the level of care
provided Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries in institutions,10 will
now be required to review the Medicare- and Medicaid-reimbursed
services rendered in all noninstitutional (ambulatory) care settings with
respect to the necessity, appropriateness, and quality of the services
provided.' Requests to the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) by PSROs to review "shared health facilities,"' 2 a subset of
ambulatory care facilities under the bill and defined to include Medi-
caid mills,'3 are to be given priority by the Secretary14 in order to expe-
dite PSRO review of the "mills." This review mechanism is intended to
curtail the over-utilization of services for which Medicare or Medicaid
reimbursement is sought.
The extension of PSRO review into the publicly funded ambula-
tory care field effects significant change. Review of the quality and ne-
cessity of medical care provided in the publicly funded ambulatory
care field has hitherto been carried out on an optional basis only.'5
Generally, ambulatory care providers have been reimbursed on a fee-
for-service basis regardless of the medical necessity or quality of the
services rendered. While the review that was conducted was sufficient
to ensure that flagrant abuse and fraud were not left wholly unde-
8. See id pt. 2, at 45-46.
9. PSROs review the necessity and quality of health care for which Medicare or Medicaid
reimbursement is sought. They are composed of members of the local medical profession who
apply local standards of quality and necessity in making review determinations. PSROs deny
reimbursement for unnecessary services and rectify quality deficiencies. See notes 18-33 and
accompanying text infra.
10. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 7, pt. 1, at 52.
II. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-4(g)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978). Fully operational (designated)
PSROs are required by this provision to begin ambulatory care review within two years after
becoming designated. Id See also H.R. REP. No. 453, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 42 (1977) (confer-
ence committee report). Though no PSROs have yet been designated, see note 17 and accompa-
nying text infra, the 108 PSROs with "conditional" designations are required to reach fully
designated status within four years by the new law. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-3(b) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978). Therefore, a large number of PSROs will be conducting ambulatory care review by
1984.
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a)(9) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
13. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 7, pt. 1, at 52-53.
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-(4)(g)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
15. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1155(g), 86 Stat. 1329
(amended 1977) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-4(g)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1978)).
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tected, 16 most efforts to monitor the necessity and quality of care were
directed toward institutional care. PSRO review of ambulatory care
represents a new and pervasive intervention in an area receiving a large
percentage of Medicare and Medicaid funds.' 7  The opportunity for
16. See, e.g., Kavaler, People, Providers and Payment-Telling It How It Is, 59 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 825 (1969).
17. In view of the unsettled state of ambulatory care review, the basis of congressional belief
that PSROs can effect cost reductions and quality control in the ambulatory care sector warrants
scrutiny. The most compelling justification Congress could have had for passing the amendments
would have been documented success of PSRO review in the institutional care setting-but no
such documentation exists. Of the 203 PSRO areas nationwide, there are 108 conditional PSROs
and 64 with planning status. In fact, as of October 1977, no PSRO had yet achieved fully opera-
tional status. S. Laudicina & A. Schneider, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments of 1977: Implications for the Poor, n.40 (National Health Law Program, Inc., 1977).
Physician cooperation, essential to this voluntary participation program, has been extended only
grudgingly at best, Medicare-Medicaid Anti-fraudand Abuse Amendments: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health ofthe House Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment ofthe House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
255, 268-69 (1977) (statement of Dr. Edgar T. Beddingfield, Jr., for American Medical Associa-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Hearing], even after significant efforts by HEW to mollify the profes-
sion. The primary purpose of the original PSRO legislation was cost containment. J. BLUM, P.
GERTMAN & J. RABINOW, PSROs AND THE LAW 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as J. BLUM]. In a
publication aimed at practitioners, however, HEW emphasized that the primary goal was quality
control. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (05) 74-50001 (1973), reprinted
in 2 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 5227 (1974). Presumably, this latter goal was
more palatable to the profession, which is opposed to regulation of any sort. Experts agree that
any attempt at this time to evaluate the effectiveness of PSROs in reducing costs or upgrading
quality would be premature. Hearing, supra at 418-19 (statement of National Council of State
Welfare Administrators, American Public Welfare Association), 321-22 (statement of Dr.
Anthony Robbins); see J. BLUM, supra at 204-05; Price, Katz & Provence, Advocate's Guide to
Utilization Review, 71 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 318 (1977). Moreover, Congress at no point ex-
presses sufficient satisfaction with PSRO efforts to date to justify the broad expansion of PSRO
utilization effected by the 1977 amendments. The legislative history, however, offers no other
reason for their enactment.
The legislative history does evince concern on the part of a number of groups that the tradi-
tional PSRO function of cost and quality control would be injudiciously altered by the amend-
ments. E.g., Hearing, supra at 5 (statement of Dr. Tim Lee Carter who cosponsored the bill), 382
(statement of Dr. Louis Finney for American Association of Neurological Surgeons), 255, 268
(statement of Dr. Edgar T. Beddingfield, Jr. for AMA Council of Legislation). Indeed, the prior-
ity given to shared health facility review, see notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra, coupled
with the requirement that PSROs make data available to federal and state Medicare and Medicaid
agencies responsible for controlling fraud and abuse, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-15(b)(1) (West Cum.
Supp. 1978), indicates a congressional intent to accord PSROs an investigative aspect foreign to
the original PSRO cost control mandate. The report of the House of Representatives accompany-
ing the amendments, however, disclaims any such intent. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 7, pt. 1,
at 53. More to the point, the extension of mandatory PSRO review to all ambulatory care serv-
ices, rather than solely to those rendered in the "mills," is not explained by the "investigative arm"
hypothesis.
Although PSROs have not been proven effective, the literature on them indicates a consensus
among observers that, even before the most recent amendments, it was likely that PSROs would
figure instrumentally in Congress' plans for establishing a national health insurance scheme, e.g.,
Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of
PSAROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 8 (1975); Kennedy, Preface Public Concern andFederal Intervention
in the Health Care Industry, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 5 (1975), possibly becoming the sole program
responsible for utilization review and quality assurance in the entire health care sector. See, e.g.,
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beneficial change, both in the PSRO program and in the nation's health
care delivery system, is great. Conversely, however, the potential for
serious harm caused by clumsy PSRO intervention in ambulatory care
is also substantial.
PSROs were created by the Social Security Amendments of 197218
in a congressional effort to contain the spiraling costs of Medicare and
Medicaid.' 9 The 1972 Act requires the Secretary of HEW to "establish
...[geographical] areas with respect to which [PSROs] may be desig-
nated,"2 and then to enter into a contract with a "qualified organiza-
tion"21 in each area, designating that organization as a "conditional"
PSRO.22 To qualify, an organization seeking PSRO designation from
HEW must be nonprofit, composed of a "substantial portion" of the
licensed doctors of medicine and osteopathy in the PSRO's designated
area, and must submit to HEW a "formal plan for the orderly assump-
tion and implementation" of statutory review responsibilities.23 After
receiving a "conditional" designation, a PSRO is to implement its plan
and become fully operational (conducting all required review) within
four years,24 whereupon it can attain "operational" status and be con-
sidered a fully designated PSRO.
"In order to promote the effective, efficient, and economical deliv-
ery of health care services of proper quality,"25 PSROs are required to
determine whether services for which Medicare or Medicaid
reimbursement is sought are medically necessary and conform to pro-
Greenburg, PSRO-On the Way, But to Where, 20 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1493, 1493 (1974).
This would obviously represent a prodigious undertaking presenting formidable transitional
and organizational problems. Perhaps, therefore, the 1977 amendments contain a hidden
agenda-the gradual implementation of PSRO expansion in an effort to cushion the impact on the
health care field and the nation's economy of an ultimately all-inclusive health care review.
18. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 1155-1170, 86 Stat. 1329.
PSROs are regulated by four sources: the statute, U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c to 1320c-22 (West 1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1978); regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 101 (1976); the program manual, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL (1974) [hereinafter cited as PSRO PRO-
GRAM MANUAL]; and transmittal letters issued by the Bureau of Quality Assurance, which is part
of HEW. The latter two sources, though not binding on PSROs because they are not promul-
gated in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-553 (1976), are made
binding by the PSRO-HEW contract. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 49; see note 48 infra. See
generally J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 19-53.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. V 1975) (declaration of purpose).
20. Id § 1320c-l(a).
21. Id
22. Id
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-l(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
24. Originally, the conditional designation period was not to exceed 24 months. Social Se-
curity Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1154(b), 86 Stat. 1329. The new law extends
that period to 48 months. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-(3)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. V 1975).
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fessional standards of quality.26 These decisions are to be made by
applying "professionally developed" norms2 7 and criteria" based upon
"typical patterns of practice in [the PSRO] region."29 If, on the basis
of its review, a PSRO finds that some or all of the services rendered or
to be rendered to a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary were or are not
medically necessary, it must deny reimbursement.30 When it finds that
the services have been of substandard quality, the PSRO can require
the provider to undertake continuing education in order to increase its
expertise,3 1 or in more serious cases, it may report the violations to
HEW, which may then suspend or exclude the provider from participa-
tion in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.32
It is apparent from this complex body of legislation that a PSRO
has two distinct review responsibilities: utilization review, to determine
the medical necessity of services; and quality assurance, to monitor and
assure compliance with professional standards of quality. Utilization
review can be thought of as establishing the maximum level of health
care services that may be reimbursed under Medicare and Medicaid by
asking: "What procedures and tests were used?" Quality assurance, in
contrast, enforces the minimum level of care acceptable to the local
members of the medical profession by asking: "What procedures and
tests were not used?" Together, the two review procedures form a
health care public accountability system33 applying peer-developed
norms and criteria to determine the adequacy and necessity of medical
services provided.
PSROs are required by the 1972 statute to conduct "concurrent"
utilization review of all hospital care for which reimbursement is
sought.34 Concurrent review is conducted while the patient is in the
26. Id PSROs are also required to determine whether institutional care was or is being
rendered in the appropriate setting-the least expensive setting consistent with quality care. Id
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (Supp. V 1975). Norms are used in evaluating necessity. They
represent the typical amount of care delivered to similar patients with similar dysfunctions. See
notes 40-42 and accompanying text infra.
28. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, § 709. The criteria used in evaluating the
quality of care represent either those procedures that local practitioners believe ought to be per-
formed, or the acceptable level of success in patient health improvement. See notes 56-63 and
accompanying text infra.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (Supp. V 1975).
30. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
31. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 41.
32. Id at 41-42.
33. See Escovitz & Zeleznick, Health Care Accountability System, in PSRO UTILIZATION
AND AUDIT IN PATIENT CARE 232 (S. Davidson ed. 1976) (comparison and contrast of two types
of PSRO review responsibilities).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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hospital to determine the necessity of his admission to the facility and
the necessity of his continued stay there.35 Prospective review, or
preadmission screening, is authorized but optional,3 6 and consists of a
determination of the necessity for elective admissions before they
occur.37 Retrospective review is conducted after discharge by reviewing
the patient's chart or an abstract of it38 only when concurrent review
has not been implemented, or when it has been ineffective.39
All utilization review scrutinizes the amount of care rendered a
patient. Hospital utilization review by PSROs deals primarily with the
length of time spent by a patient in the facility. A norm representing
the typical length of stay for previous subjects in a patient's age-sex-
diagnosis category is used to determine his permissible length of stay;40
any stay lasting longer than that norm must be justified to the PSRO by
the patient's attending physician.4 An analogous norm, representing
the typical number of doctor visits in a patient's age-sex-diagnosis cate-
gory, has been used successfully in ambulatory care utilization review
to reduce the costs of care without prejudice to professional quality
standards.42 It can therefore be reasonably anticipated that PSROs will
undertake review for medical necessity of the number of doctor visits,
applying norms analogous to those employed in length of stay hospital
review.
It is likely that this review will be concurrent or retrospective, since
prospective screening by a doctor to determine if a patient needs to see
a doctor would be impractical, wasteful, and quite possibly unconstitu-
tional.43 Moreover, concurrent review in the ambulatory care setting
will likely be the exception and not the rule because of practical limita-
tions. Concurrent review of length of stay in hospitals is achieved by
35. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 6-8. See generally Price, Katz & Provence, supra note 17.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
37. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 6.
38. Id at 8.
39. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, § 707(b).
40. Id § 709.15. See J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 316-18, for a discussion of hospital utiliza-
tion review as performed by in-house utilization review committees. PSRO utilization review is
identical in its essentials. Id at 322.
41. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 323. Permissible deviations from the norm are represented
by "standards." PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, §§ 705.2, -.24, -.26, 709.14.
42. See Sasuly & Hopkins, A Medical Society-,ponsored Comprehensive Medical Care
Plan-The Foundationfor Medical Care of San Joaquin County, California, 5 MED. CARE 234,247
table 7 (1967).
43. Cf. American Med. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 921 (1975) (pending trial on merits,
enforcement of HEW regulations requiring hospitals participating in Medicare or Medicaid to
perform review of hospital admissions within 24 hours after they occur enjoined, primarily be-
cause they endangered right of patient to receive treatment).
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requiring that, in order for a patient to be reimbursed for hospital days
beyond the date determined to be the norm for his age-sex-diagnosis
group, a reviewer must certify before that date the necessity of an ex-
tension.' Analogously, when an ambulatory care patient is scheduled
for a regular medical appointment with his physician, he could be told
before he makes his norm-exceeding visit that Medicare or Medicaid
will not pay for it, if that is the PSRO decision. Plainly, however, this
can be done only when the patient is expected to return to the same
physician in connection with the same illness that prompted his previ-
ous visit or visits. Except in the case of chronic or moderately serious
illness when return visits to the doctor are expected, the typical illness
episode will probably not be so predictable. Thus, quite often, review
will of necessity be retrospective.
That being so, a significant shift in the importance given cost of
care by PSRO reviewing committees may be forthcoming. In con-
ducting concurrent review of the "necessity" of health care services
before they are rendered, doctors quite correctly give considerable
weight to the patient's right to receive treatment.45 Because the PSRO
decision will affect the care to be received by a particular patient, reim-
bursement will often be favored in those borderline cases in which the
marginal benefit to the patient is small and the cost of the service great.
When retrospective review is conducted, however, treatment has al-
ready been given; consequently, only the right to payment is at stake.
Freed of the necessity of considering a particular patient's needs, the
PSRO may be more prone to take a "macro" view of the costs and
benefits of health care-the PSRO can decide the necessity of particu-
lar health care services by a dispassionate balancing of their benefits
and costs, unencumbered by the natural tendency in a marginal situa-
tion to provide a particular patient all beneficial services.46
The PSRO Program Manual provisions,4' however, promulgated
by HEW as binding 48 "guidelines" for PSRO operation, require that
44. See authorities cited note 35 supra.
45. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 17, at 59.
46. The PSRO reimbursement decision may become more akin to a policy decision about
whether to relax a building code requirement, and less like the humanitarian decision to spend
thousands of dollars to rescue a person trapped in a collapsed building. See id PSROs can
adequately safeguard physician expectations of reimbursement by resolving difficult necessity is-
sues of first impression in their favor, while denying reimbursement prospectively to future prov-
iders rendering the service in question.
47. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18.
48. The guidelines in the PSRO Manual are made binding on the PSROs through the
PSRO-HEW contract. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 49. This method of operating a government
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retrospective review be conducted only when concurrent review is inef-
fective or not yet implemented.4 9 It can be argued that, given the exi-
gencies of ambulatory care delivery, concurrent review will almost
always be ineffective, except in the case of chronic or moderately seri-
ous illness when patient visits can be anticipated. In addition, the re-
striction on retrospective review is based upon the principle that
retroactive denial of payment imposes a hardship on beneficiary and
provider alike, and is avoidable by use of concurrent review." This
consideration, however, is undoubtedly of less weight in the ambula-
tory care context because the cost of ambulatory care is only a small
fraction of the cost of a typical hospital bill. The efficacy of the HEW
restriction as applied to ambulatory care review is, therefore, question-
able.
In addition to utilization review responsibilities, PSROs are re-
quired to monitor the quality of health care billed to Medicare and
Medicaid. PSRO review of hospital care quality is accomplished
through the use of two forms of "medical audit": profile review and
Medical Care Evaluation studies (MCEs).5 1 Profile review is
mandatory, 2 and entails the maintenance and review of "profiles"
which contain records of the covered care rendered by individual prov-
iders. 3 MCEs are retrospective reviews of patient charts conducted to
determine whether health care practices meet current standards of ac-
ceptability.54 Profile review can be used to identify the specific
problems affecting medical quality, which in turn can be addressed by
MCEs or concurrent utilization review.55
The crucial variables in quality assurance are "criteria," predeter-
mined elements against which the quality of care can be measured. 6
There is an ongoing and far from resolved debate over what form these
criteria should assume; in particular, whether they should be process
criteria, specifying procedures to be followed by the provider, or out-
program has been severely criticized for its failure to ensure public input into the PSRO regulation
process. See, e.g., Willett, PSRO Today: A Lawyer'rAssessment, 292 NEw ENGLAND J. MED.
340, 340-41 (1975).
49. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, § 707(b).
50. See generally S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 115-44 (1974).
51. J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 29-3 1; Price, Katz & Provence, supra note 17, at 322.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c4(a)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
53. Id
54. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 18, § 705.31.
55. Price, Katz & Provence, supra note 17, at 322.




come criteria, measuring the ultimate effect on patients' health of the
care rendered.57
Process criteria are professionally recognized procedures to be fol-
lowed in diagnosing and treating specific symptoms or conditions. 8
Their use is justifiable on the assumption that the best way to ensure
the health of patients is to require that all the recognized procedures for
diagnosis and treatment be followed in each case. Procedures used as
process criteria,. however, need not be validated by clinical tests or stud-
ies establishing their efficacy in improving patients' health.5 9 Conse-
quently, process criteria have been formally applied in evaluating the
"quality" of care even though the procedures required have not been
demonstrated to be efficacious in improving patients' conditions.
Process criteria are, however, easy to apply in the hospital setting,
where all tests and treatments administered to a patient are recorded
57. This so-called outcome/process debate has carried over to the ambulatory care quality
assurance field, there to join a myriad of other problems yet to be resolved by those employing this
infant discipline. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 154 (statement of Dr. John Bussman). See
generally Christoffel & Loewenthal, Evaluating the Quality of Ambulatory Health Care: A Review
ofEmerging Methods, 15 MED. CARE 877 (1977). For example, care is frequently rendered despite
the lack of a specific diagnosis to which procedure-or outcome-oriented criteria may be applied.
Physicians lack control over patient adherence to instructions outside the office, thus blurring the
correlation between care provided and the health of the patient. Incomplete treatment records
hinder medical audit. Finally, there remain significant problems in collecting and standardizing
data. Id at 879-82. Existing ambulatory care quality assurance programs have done little to-
ward solving these and other problems, and there is no consensus on what the most efficient,
feasible and productive methods are for doing so. 1 N. WHITE, M. RYLAND, G. GIEBINK, D.
MCCONATHA & A. TOMAN, AMBULATORY CARE QUALITY ASSURANCE PROJECT 41 (1976). An
exhaustive bibliography of the ambulatory care quality assurance literature may be found in 3 id
58. Christoffel & Loewenthal, supra note 57, at 885-86. See generally Williamson, Evaluat-
ing Quality ofPatient Care: A Strategy Relating Outcome and Process Assessmen4 218 J.A.M.A.
564 (1971). For an example of a quality audit employing process criteria exclusively, see B.
PAYNE, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE: EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT (1976). A list of
items to be checked in patient history was composed by four panels of Hawaii physicians, symp-
toms to be discovered, and treatment to be rendered for a number of disorders. Each of these
criteria was weighted according to its importance to the patient's health, and the weighted sum of
the criteria met by a physician or group of physicians yielded a "Physician Performance Index"
representing the quality of care provided. Id at 20-28.
59. Indeed, serious impediments to validation testing of many procedures make validation
impossible. See McDermott, Evaluating The Physician and His Technolog in DOING BETrER
AND FEELING WORSE, supra note 4, at 135, 148-53. The PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note
18, requires that MCE criteria be based first on scientific evidence of a procedure's efficacy and
then on expert judgment. Id § 705.35(a). In a study by Brook and Appel, process criteria based
on expert judgment were applied to a group of 296 patients with urinary tract infections or ulcer-
ated gastric or duodenal lesions. The results showed that, while only 1.4% of the patients received
adequate care under explicit-process scrutiny (and 23.3% under implicit-process scrutiny), 63%
experienced satisfactory outcomes of treatment. Brook & Appel, Quality-of-Care Assessment:
Choosing.A MethodFor Peer Review, 288 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 1323, 1327 (1973). It has been
noted that "many widely accepted therapies have never been subjected to randomized, controlled
clinical trials to establish their efficacy in improving patients' health." Havighurst & Blumstein,
supra note 17, at 29; accord, Christoffel & Loewenthal, supra note 57, at 884.
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using a uniform system.6°
Outcome criteria, on the other hand, seek to measure the effect on
patients' health of the diagnostic and therapeutic procedures employed
by measuring the incidence of post-treatment mortality, morbidity,
physical and psychological impairment, and ability to function nor-
mally. 6 ' Even with short-term, disease-specific outcome
criteria-those that evaluate the effects of care on specific dysfunctions
observable within a year after treatment-collection of data must be
accomplished by the difficult task of follow-up surveys of former pa-
tients. Nevertheless, these outcome criteria are preferable to process cri-
teria due to the paucity of scientific evidence substantiating the efficacy
of many routine procedures, 62 and because of the usefulness of out-
come criteria in comparing the effectiveness of alternative modes of
and settings for treatment of various illnesses.6 3 Finally, the logic of
outcome criteria-that the best way to assure good results of care is to
measure them directly-is persuasive.
Although there may be good reason for preferring the convenience
of process- over outcome-oriented criteria in the hospital setting, when
concerned with ambulatory care different considerations must come
into play to account for the unique circumstances of this latter type of
care. (For example, the ease of data collection in the process approach
is absent in the ambulatory care setting, in which no uniform system is
in widespread use. 4) In choosing between the two types of criteria, pol-
icy-makers at HEW should consider the differences between in-patient
and ambulatory care goals and methodologies, the advances which
may be expected to be achieved in providing satisfactory ambulatory
care, and the role ambulatory care will play in the future of the health
care delivery system.
Quality assurance criteria should be sensitive to the effects on pa-
tient welfare of all aspects of health care. Nontechnical factors play a
crucial role in the effect of care on a patient's health, particularly in the
60. Christoffel & Loewenthal, supra note 57, at 881.
61. See generally Brook, Davies-Avery, Greenfield, Harris, Lelah, Solomon & Ware, Assess-
ing the Quality of Medical Care Using Outcome Measures: An Overview of the Method, 15 MED.
CARE, Supp. No. 9, Sept. 1977, at 1, 9 table 9.
62. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
63. Process criteria, by which the quality of care is judged according to its conformance to
model treatment procedures, are inapplicable for this purpose. PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra
note 18, mentions process criteria, id § 705.35(a), and outcome criteria, id § 705.35(d) as appro-
priate methods of quality review, but expresses no preference for either.
64. Christoffel & Loewenthal, supra note 57, at 879.
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ambulatory care setting.6 5 The ability of a physician to establish a rap-
port with his patient and to gain his confidence and trust is probably as
important a factor in inducing a patient to follow a physician's advice
after he leaves the office (a problem peculiar to ambulatory care) as is
the patient's comprehension of the seriousness of his condition.
Without continuity of care, in which the ongoing responsibility for the
health of a patient remains with the same physician or group of physi-
cians, this crucial rapport is difficult to establish.66 Continuity of care is
facilitated by the ability of a doctor or health facility to provide a com-
prehensive array of services. In a survey sample of hospital outpatient
facilities, fragmentation of special services into separate departments
was cited, along with a lack of continuity of care, as being a primary
reason for substandard care. 67 With inpatient treatment, these
problems cannot arise.
Process criteria, however, fail to give sufficient weight to this par-
ticularly significant aspect of health care effectiveness. If the tests and
treatments performed at two different ambulatory care facilities are
identical, process criteria would indicate that the facilities are provid-
ing care of equal quality. Yet one facility, because of its poor organi-
zation or the inability of its doctors to gain the confidence of their
patients, might fail dismally to improve or maintain the health of its
patients. Outcome criteria, on the other hand, could readily identify
the deficient facility as a target for in-depth study and its failings could
then be identified and remedied.
Finally, the application of process criteria to a facility excelling in
the nontechnical aspects of care could easily result in the institution of
"defensive medicine" tactics68 in an effort to gain for that facility the
malpractice immunity offered by the 1972 amendments on condition of
adherence to PSRO criteria,69 and to avoid PSRO rebuke or corrective
sanctions.7 ° In undertaking such practices the facility would be
65. Cf. Rogers, supra note 4, at 82 (primary care is concerned with psychological as well as
physical aspects of illness). The primary care provider is the point of first contact between the
patient and the health care system. Additionally, the majority of ambulatory patients suffer from
disorders of lesser physical severity, indicating the greater relative importance of psychological
factors in the eventual outcome of care.
66. See id at 81.
67. BIo-DYNAMICS, INC., A STUDY OF SELECTED INNOVATIVE HOSPITAL PROGRAMS IN AM-
BULATORY CARE 12-28 (1974).
68. See McDermott, supra note 59, at 139.
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. V 1975). See generally Comment, PSRO: Malprac-
tice Liability and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1974).
70. See notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
1978] PSR 0 S
NORTH C4ROLINA LAW REVIEW
performing procedures that its experience has shown could be sup-
planted by less expensive (or more effective) measures. The result
would inevitably be a disinclination to adopt innovative techniques of
organization or treatment in favor-of continued-and perhaps unjusti-
fied-reliance on the prescribed procedures.71
Research and development in health care delivery methodologies
must be fostered by PSROs, not discouraged, if the program is success-
fully to aid in the development of a satisfactory health care system. In
recent years, the ambulatory care sector has assumed a primary role in
exploring ways to improve health while cutting costs. Preventive
screening can result in a dramatic reduction of the incidence of serious
illness and days of hospitalization.72 Similarly, maternal and infant
care treatment centers are invaluable in reducing infant mortality.73
Further, efforts to employ the learning of the behavioral and social sci-
ences in ambulatory care are soon to be underway.74 Finally, Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), as well as other prepaid group
health care plans, are of special concern because they provide an im-
portant competitive alternative to fee-for-service providers. Because
they are funded on a prepaid basis, they have only a limited amount of
funds available for financing health care delivery. HMOs therefore
have a strong economic incentive to develop low-cost alternatives to
traditional, fee-for-service developed techniques.7 5
All of these innovations hold out the prospect of improving the
quality of ambulatory care delivery at reduced cost. More impor-
tantly, they offer ways of avoiding costly hospitalization at a time when
such alternatives are sorely needed.76 The PSRO program should
71. This undesirable phenomenon, commonly known as "cookbook medicine," results from
rigid application of process criteria without regard to whether the processes are proven efficacious
or not. See J. BLUM, supra note 17, at 77-78. This stifling effect on innovation is manifested in
two ways. First, by requiring that certain procedures be used, alternative methods for treating or
diagnosing the same condition are discarded, regardless of their outcome effectiveness. Second,
the more procedures are required, the less resources are available to fund alternative programs
such as preventive screening and maintenance, whose aggregate benefit to the population served
by a facility and to the entire health care delivery system may far exceed that of the prescribed
practice.
72. Screening of children for rheumatic fever in Baltimore caused a 60% drop in the inci-
dence of that disease. Rogers, supra note 4, at 88.
73. In Omaha, Nebraska, these centers accomplished a 60% reduction in infant mortality in
a five-year period. Id
74, Id at 102; McDermott, supra note 59, at 156.
75. See Havighurst & Bovbjerg, Professional Standards Review Organizations and Health
Maintenance Organizations: re They Compatible?, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 381.
76. Between 1965 and 1974, the cost of medical care rose approximately 100%. In that same
period, the cost of a semiprivate hospital room rose 166%. Rogers, supra note 4, at 89 figure 4.
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respect these trends,77 allow them to develop, and where feasible,
provide incentives for their proliferation. Excessive or rigid applica-
tion of process criteria in PSRO quality audits could unwisely divert
limited resources from innovative programs as well as hinder the devel-
opment of alternative technical and nontechnical skills in ambulatory
care.78 Given the significance of the public health care sector,79 and the
magnitude of national health care expenditures,80 clumsy PSRO activ-
ity in the ambulatory care area could have far-reaching negative eco-
nomic and social effects. Conversely, by careful implementation of a
national policy restricting the use of process criteria to appropriate
circumstances ,' and by promotion of the general use of retrospective
utilization review, 2 HEW could effect major beneficial changes in the
health care delivery system.
SAUL Louis MOSKOWITZ
77. "Primary ambulatory care with an emphasis on prevention, diagnostic screening, refer-
ral, preventive maintenance, and health education constitutes the wave of the future in medical
care delivery." C. OAKES, THE WALKING PATIENT AND THE HEALTH CRISIS 325 (1973).
78. Senator Edward M. Kennedy has warned that PSRO standards, "once defined and ar-
ticulated, must not become inflexible, thereby constituting barriers to innovation and evolution in
the provision of health care." Kennedy, supra note 17, at 3.
79. In 1975 public expenditures for health and medical care totalled $50 billion. S. AXEL-
ROD, A. DONABEDIAN & D. GENTRY, MEDICAL CARE CHART BOOK 107 (rev. 6th ed. 1976).
80. In 1975, $118.5 billion dollars were spent on health and medical care in the United
States. Id
81. One of the primary responsibilities of the ambulatory care provider is to identify those
cases that, though innocent in appearance, are in fact very serious and call for immediate treat-
ment. Rogers, supra note 4, at 82. A skeletal set of diagnostic process criteria are required to
assure that these cases are detected. Additionally, those procedures whose efficacy has been sci-
entifically verified, and whose benefits clearly outweigh the costs engendered by their application,
should be used as process criteria. This sensible method of criteria development was first sug-
gested in Williamson, supra note 58, at 564. The process criteria thus employed could be referred
to as "essential" criteria as opposed to "optimal" criteria. See Christoffel & Loewenthal, supra
note 57, at 887.
82. See notes 44-50 and accompanying text supra.

